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Common Security in Latin America 
The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco 
Introduction 
The end of the Cold War has brought to the fore the question of the future 
security structure of the international system. The events accompanying the 
retreat of the Cold War have raised speculation about its impact on regional 
stability and the need for new security arrangements throughout the world. By 
the end of the 1980s the new international detente was accompanied by a shift 
in superpower behaviour with a new emphasis on de-escalation and non-violent 
resolution of regional conflicts. These changes have not only highlighted the 
role of indigenous factors in regional conflicts and the potential relaxation of 
important constraints on such conflicts, but also the likely attenuation of 
previous patterns of tension and violence, as military assistance and 
expenditures diminish.1 Although attempts to draw a mechanical association 
between the end of the Cold War and regional instability could be seriously 
questioned, the concern with new approaches to security has been further 
reinforced by the impact of the Gulf War. The dramatic events in the Middle 
East have led to the focusing of attention on the role of collective security 
arrangements and regional appoaches to security, as well as to the pressing 
problem of nuclear proliferation. Moreover, Moscow's withdrawal from its 
previous status as a world superpower has unleashed a period of significant 
reflection about the control of and the role to be played by nuclear weapons. 
This paper attempts to assess the extent to which the concept of common 
security could be applied to Latin America and in particular to the regional non-
proliferation regime. Although the notion of 'security regime' refers to the 
condition by which states observe and expect others to respect certain norms 
or rules of restraint in their military relations, the unique character of nuclear 
interdependence highlights the central role of common security. Consequently, 
it could be stated that both the global and the regional non-proliferation regimes 
represent important mechanisms for common security. 
Since the early days of the nuclear age the prospects of nuclear annihilation 
have captured the concern of successive generations. Even though the 
possibility of a future free of nuclear weapons has become increasingly difficult 
to envisage, the process of coming to terms with the reality of nuclear weapons 
has proved equally complex and painful. The immensity of the stakes involved 
for humanity in an eventual use of nuclear weapons forced attention to focus 
on new concepts and approaches to provide for national and international 
security. As Michael Howard has pointed out, in a world of sovereign states 
defence continued to be a necessity and nuclear war a 'terrible possibility that 
nothing can now eradicate but of whose horrors we must never lose sight'.2 
Reactions to this dilemma have varied from absolutist arguments against 
nuclear weapons, which tend to assume the desirability and the possibility of 
the elimination of all means of warfare, to less ambitious but more successful 
efforts aimed at subjecting these weapons to various types of restraint and 
limitations, and finally, to more cynical attitudes in which the existence and the 
role of nuclear weapons are optimistically or pessimistically taken for granted. 
The idea of the nuclear-free zone (NFZ) lies between the first and the second 
set of responses. According to one view, NFZs should be seen as the first step 
towards total and complete disarmament. This approach dominated the 
literature on arms control during the 1950s and provided the background for the 
discussion of the first set of nuclear-free zones. The view of arms control 
efforts as leading to total disarmament proved to be seriously flawed, not only 
for its low feasibility but above all for the untenable nature of its implicit 
assumptions. The fundamental problem of disarmament in the sense of the 
elimination of all means of warfare is not so much the impossibility of 
achieving such a goal as the inherent lack of meaning: 4as long as men have 
hands with which to pick up stones war cannot be made physically 
impossible'.3 An alternative and more recent view sees NFZs as belonging to 
the wider arms control effort which is no longer considered as an end in itself 
but as a means towards the achievement of security against the nuclear danger. 
This posture recognises arms control as crucially important to the preservation 
of security, and above all, to the prevention of nuclear war. This version of 
NFZs acknowledges the reality of a nuclear world but it moves towards the 
goal of reducing and limiting its scope. It involves a change of emphasis from 
nuclear to non-nuclear forms of defence. 
This shift in the perception of the potential role to be played by NFZs is 
closely linked, on the one hand to the events leading to the emergence of a 
nuclear dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, geared to 
managing their strategic relation, and on the other to the gradual emergence of 
a wider debate about alternative approaches to security. After a decade of 
unsuccessful negotiations, the focal point was shifted from measures designed 
either to remove nuclear weapons from world affairs or to maintain a nuclear 
monopoly, towards attempts to make their presence more tolerable. This latter 
approach enabled both superpowers to share responsibility for nuclear matters. 
Nuclear-free zones not only belong to this approach but they are also an 
exception to the pattern whereby concern with and the pursuit of nuclear arms 
control have been mostly been addressed by and delegated to the superpowers. 
In the idea of NFZs the goal of preventing an increase in the number of nuclear 
states is shared by both nuclear and non-nuclear states. This concept, therefore, 
provides a basis for the conciliation of conflicting interests between the spheres 
of national and international security.4 
Although Latin America has not been directly exposed to the dilemmas of 
extended nuclear deterrence, it has been widely acknowledged that the impact 
of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 made regional states aware of the risks 
involved in a nuclear crisis. What seems clear is that the Latin American NFZ 
has contributed to the renewed interest in the concept of NFZs from three main 
angles. Firstly, and to the extent that the Latin American non-proliferation 
regime has offered a framework to manage the impact of nuclear technology 
inroads on regional stability, it has highlighted the advantages of such schemes 
when compared with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Secondly, the Latin 
American example has also indicated the potential of NFZs for the development 
of common security postures. And thirdly, it has made clear the advantages of 
regional non-proliferation agreements over the NPT, to states reluctant to 
surrender nuclear development but willing to consider non-nuclear postures. 
Following the Cuban missile crisis the Latin American states embarked on 
a regional denuclearisation effort. While it is true that the origins of this 
enterprise were, to a considerable extent, the result of the impact of the missile 
crisis throughout the region, the history of the negotiations leading to the 
signature of the 1967 Treaty of Tlateloco makes clear the support of both 
superpowers for the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone. It is possible to 
identify the Cuban crisis as providing ground for common interests in security 
both between the superpowers and between nuclear and non-nuclear states. This 
experience helped shift the superpowers' attitudes towards nuclear proliferation 
from bi-polar rivalry to gradual cooperation and also strengthened the positive 
value of non-nuclear status. The crucial point is that this event served as a 
catalyst for the setting up of a non-proliferation regime as a communal 
framework for security.5 
The Latin American NFZ became the first denuclearised region embracing 
a significant number of states. The absence of either previous or subsequent 
successful negotiations in other parts of the world, together with the apparent 
impasse underlying its implementation during the 1970s, raised doubts as to the 
viability of NFZs as an effective model for arms control. Several reasons 
account for such general mistrust. Initially most of the proposals remained 
entangled with Cold War rivalries, but the inherent complexity of arms control 
negotiations was magnified by the fact that nuclear strategy was in a formative 
period. Besides, structural problems such as geostrategic location were further 
complicated by the lack of clear evidence as to the advantages of non-nuclear 
postures. The more favourable conditions generated by the state of detente 
between the United States and the USSR, of which their mutual interest in a 
non-proliferation regime was both expression and cause, were mostly employed 
in the quid-pro-quo approach of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was then 
assumed that non-nuclear status could be made attractive through regulated 
access to 'peaceful ' nuclear technology and effective arms control. As a result, 
most nuclear-free zone proposals were gradually abandoned and efforts 
concentrated on convincing the new nuclear states - China and India - to 
adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, the transition from the 
'idealist' towards a less ambitious view of arms control complicated any 
assessment of the actual potential of NFZs. Lastly, high levels of tension or the 
simple lack of sufficient conditions and/or necessary mechanisms precluded the 
materialisation of other initiatives. 
Although it would be wrong to suggest that no obstacles have hindered the 
implementation of the Tlatelolco Treaty, it would be equally erroneous to deny 
those steps indicating clear progress in the direction of its original goals. Such 
progress has been the result, firstly, of the continued efforts of those parties 
explicitly convinced of the advantages attached to non-nuclear postures; 
secondly, of the concurrence of interests between those states and the 
superpowers' concern with nuclear proliferation; thirdly of the presence of an 
international consensus favouring nuclear non-proliferation; fourthly, of the 
security dilemma inherent in the nuclear option; fifthly, of the favourable 
ground provided by NFZs for the development of common security interests; 
and finally, of the particular characteristics of NFZs which give such schemes 
the necessary flexibility to allow for adjustment as international circumstances 
change or require. 
While it is true that there is no absolute consensus as to the proper meaning 
of common security, and some would argue that it remains an idea still in the 
process of being thoroughly clarified, several core elements are identifiable. 
Common security is devised to begin or encourage a process that will 
eventually contribute to stability and the reduction of tension. This is primarily 
sought through the stimulation of alternative thinking to that which has often 
accompanied arms races and conventional conflict, by encouraging the change 
of threatening habits and promoting the common interest in cooperative 
dynamics.6 In addition, common security not only departs from the assumption 
that, in the nuclear age, nuclear interdependence reveals the preeminence of 
nuclear survival over nuclear strategy, but emphasises the link between such 
interdependence and common interests. Common security also maintains that 
states seeking protection through unilateral zero-sum decisions are unlikely to 
achieve security. The security policies of states should take into account the 
position of opponents and should even contemplate eventual cooperation with 
adversaries. Finally, implicit in the idea of common security is the belief in the 
possibility of reversing the spiral of ams races associated with the security 
dilemma both through the adoption of a range of arms control, disarmament and 
confidence building measures and through non-threatening military strategies.7 
To what extent is this notion of common security applicable to the Latin 
American non-proliferation regime? Which were the main elements providing 
a feeling of common insecurity, a sense of common endeavour and an eventual 
drive to common military cooperation? What have been the origins and tasks 
of Confidence Building Measures within the region?8 This paper will identify 
the factors leading to the adoption of common security postures in Latin 
America, within the context of the two main regionalist currents. The two 
dimensions of regionalism in the Western Hemisphere refer on the one hand to 
regional cooperation among Latin American states, dating back to the times of 
independence, and on the other to the Inter-American regionalism which 
originated in the 19th century and was soon associated with an indisputable US 
hegemony. 
The underlying motivations leading to the creation of a non-proliferation 
regime in Latin America could be traced within the two traditions. On the one 
hand, such a regime was seen as enabling the Latin American states to set 
limits to US nuclear hegemony and to reduce the nuclear danger within the 
region, and on the other, its potential to buttress the virtual nuclear monopoly 
of the United States within the Western Hemisphere not only became clear to 
some of the participants, but most importantly, it provided a main source of 
opposition to the agreement. Despite this, the support of the United States was 
a crucial element in the successful completion of the agreement. 
Responsibility for regional security and defence of the hemisphere had 
gradually been transferred to the United States. This process originated in the 
projection of American power over the region following the formulation of the 
Monroe doctrine in 1823. The 1898 Spanish War and the construction of the 
Panama Canal, at the turn of the century, laid the basis for US naval supremacy 
over both the Atlantic and the Pacific, and led to the Caribbean basin and the 
Mexican Gulf being seen as the 'American Mediterranean'. During the 1930s, 
through its 'Good Neighbours' policy, the US had expanded its aegis over the 
whole of Latin America, asserting its responsibility for defending the region 
against foreign threats. By 1939 the perception of expansionist action by the 
Axis powers led to the adoption of a hemispheric strategy of collective 
responsibility. This strategy identified the Axis powers and their regional 
sympathisers as the fundamental threat, until the Cold War, when this threat 
was replaced by the Soviet Union and its Latin American affiliates, the 
communist parties in the region. In 1945 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff identified 
the following military-strategic objectives for Latin America: military 
cooperation for continental defence, securing the availability of strategic raw 
material, maintaining access to main air bases and ports, establishing military 
missions in all Latin American states and training Latin American military 
personnel in US war colleges.9 
The postwar security regime was not only established under US leadership 
but it also reflected the hegemonic position of the United States in the region. 
It was embodied in the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 
the Charter of the Organisation of American States and a number of bilateral 
military agreements.10 Although the Rio Treaty was unanimously ratified by 
all regional states, some of the Latin American states had not only maintained 
a cautious position vis-a-vis this agreement, but also opposed a 1957 US plan 
to establish closer relation between NATO and the OAS, a plan which sought 
to tie up the net of regional security pacts characteristic of that decade.11 
Increasing differences between the US and Latin American states gradually 
undermined this regime and the issue of nuclear non-proliferation was no 
exception to the general trend. In fact, the intersection of an increasing Latin 
American perception that the US presence in the region was acquiring 
hegemonic proportions - particularly after the 1954 overthrow of Arbenz in 
Guatemala - with a number of localised regional rivalries and suspicions, 
provided the context for the discussion of the initiative for regional 
denuclearisation.12 Yet, as will become apparent, concern about nuclear non-
proliferation cut across Latin American and inter-American regionalism and 
revealed the potential for the development of significant areas of common 
interests. Most importantly, the creation and the relative positive performance 
of a regional non-proliferation regime has highlighted, on the one hand, the 
scope for common security in the region, and the potential of nuclear-free zones 
to deal with the nuclear threat, and on the other, it has also contributed to 
revitalising the interest in arrangements for regional security. 
Nye's expression 'Peace in Parts' conveys a clear idea about the role of 
regional organisations in world order. Although these organisations do not 
provide 'a master key to peaceful world order' they contribute 'small but useful 
pieces to the puzzle of peace'.13 Regional organisations have been regarded 
as those entities occupying the middle ground between states and global 
organisations. Although collective agencies, including regional organisations, 
have not been particularly effective and it is also true that significant factors 
have often inhibited fruitful regional cooperation, 'the regional level 
hypothetically represents the primary arena for cooperation and mutual security 
arrangements'.14 In fact, simple physical proximity engenders more security 
interaction among neighbours than among states located in different 
geographical areas.15 Traditional arguments favouring regionalism for the 
purposes of world order have often stressed, firstly, the weight of consensus 
and common interests - more likely to be found in regional contexts - in 
providing unique frameworks for regional order and stability, secondly, their 
positive impact on order at the global level resulting both from relatively 
accepted norms aimed at limiting power competition, and from their 
contribution in easing the tasks of negotiation and the international suveillance 
of regional security agreements.16 Regionalism could normally be the result 
either of decisions freely agreed among regional states or of different levels of 
hegemonic imposition, ranging from annexation to more benevolent forms of 
influence.17 Whatever their origins, in most cases the underlying rationale to 
regionalism contemplates the reduction of superpower dominance, the limitation 
of external intervention, restraints on the resort to war among regional states, 
and the limitation of conflict among regional states.18 
Europe excepted, the record of regionalism over the past two decades has not 
been particularly outstanding. Although currently subject to considerable 
pressure, the postwar European political order gradually evolved to the status 
of a 'security community'.19 Drawing on the European experience, regionalist 
peace models have often emphasised the likely positive impact of economic 
cooperation on the security of states. Not surprisingly, these functionalist 
arguments have been subsequently criticised for a basic misconception, which 
assumes that increasing economic ties would automatically translate into 
regional cooperation, and for the underestimation of the weight of political 
considerations in the success or otherwise of regional endeavours. Although 
economic, political and organisational links may highlight the potential and 
likely features of regionalism, equally important are the perception and 
interpretation of these factors by politicians and their relationship to the wider 
foreign policy goals of regional states. It is possible to foresee a revival of 
interest in regionalism as the Cold War fades away creating new room for 
regional autonomy, and as the United States proves either unwilling or unable 
to play a global role. 
In this scenario, the Latin American experience in both regionalism and 
common security postures provides interesting insights and a more positive 
record. Not only has regionalism, and in particular its Latin American version, 
provided a solid basis for dealing with the problem of nuclear proliferation, but 
it has also offered a framework for efforts aiming at a peaceful settlement in 
Central America and at Cuba's rapprochement to the region. With regard to 
common security elements, the Latin American case, and more specifically the 
regional non-proliferation regime, has revealed the existence of significant 
elements of common security, and equally important, their potential to limit the 
scope for differences in critical areas. It would be unrealistic to expect total 
convergence among views of what would best promote confidence. Yet the 
replacement of previous important differences, with respect to nuclear 
proliferation, by what increasingly emerges as a common posture offers a clear 
example of the potential of the regional non-poliferation regime to deal with a 
particularly sensitive issue such as technology transfer. Nonetheless, this 
example also demonstrates the need to incorporate proper mechanisms that 
enable the parties to maintain the delicate balance between the perceived needs 
of national security and regional security cooperation. It is particularly 
important to emphasise the non-permanent nature of regional security 
cooperation and the extent to which its viability could be affected by abrupt 
changes in national agendas and unfavourable international environments. 
Consequently it could be rightly stated that the prospects for the Latin 
American non-proliferation regime will be significantly influenced by the 
combination of incentives, including access to sensitive technologies and the 
desire to avoid the potential costs of nuclear options, with measures for nuclear 
restraint at both the regional and sub-regional levels. 
The idea of the nuclear-free zone 
The idea of nuclear-free zones was first introduced by the Soviet Union in 
1956. It had its historical precedent in the concept of demilitarised zones in 
conventional warfare, in which a partial or total ban on the deployment, 
production or use of particular weapons or troops was established. Most 
demilitarised zones were temporary and limited in scope, in most cases 
encompassing only parts of the territory of member states. 
The nuclear environment leading to the formulation of the first 
denuclearisation proposals created the need for an explicit renunciation and the 
complete banning of nuclear weapons by signatory nations. In principle, 
therefore, NFZs include groups of countries and delimited areas of the globe. 
As Hedley Bull states with reference to 'zones of peace', and applying this 
scheme to the notion of nuclear-free zones, a NFZ could be understood as a 
geographical area in which the complete absence of nuclear weapons has been 
ensured, and the danger of nuclear war has therefore been reduced or 
contained.20 In an international environment in which the political, economic 
and strategic dimensions of interdependence cannot be denied, in which the 
presence of nuclear weapons reinforces this interdependence, no zone can 
remain completely free from the dangers of war started outside it. Even so, 
measures such as the creation of NFZs could help to reduce or contain internal 
and external nuclear threats. 
The concept of nuclear-free zone rests on four main pillars. Firstly, the 
participatory countries must undertake a legal obligation under international law 
not to produce or deploy nuclear weapons in their territories, nor to permit 
other countries within their zone to carry out such deployment. This obligation 
must be equally valid in times of war and in times of peace. Secondly, the 
nuclear states, for their part, must undertake to respect the status of the NFZ 
and to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against states 
within such a zone. Thirdly, an international control apparatus or system must 
be set up in order to ascertain that the parties to a NFZ, as well as the nuclear 
states, comply with their commitments. Fourthly, nuclear-free zones must be 
so established and administered that they enhance international peace and 
security.21 
Like any other arms control proposal nuclear-free zones serve 'strategic' and 
'political-psychological' as well as diplomatic and foreign policy objectives. In 
the case of both continental and tension NFZs, the strategic objectives include 
the improvement of the national and regional security of the states party to the 
agreement. Such improvement is achieved by removing nuclear weapons from 
the area, by sparing states from the threat of nuclear attack or involvement in 
nuclear war and by containing the military presence and influence of regional 
hegemonic powers. Political-psychological objectives are served by the 
mobilisation of opposition against provocative policies by any of the nuclear 
powers. The diplomatic objective, as in the case of all proposals, 'is the attempt 
to identify common interests with other states in the field of military policy and 
to devise means whereby these common interests may be advanced'.22 
In relation to wider objectives of peace and security, NFZ proposals might 
strengthen international peace and security in several ways: firstly, by 
preventing and controlling the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
the emergence of regional arms races. Secondly, by removing the danger of 
nuclear war arising out of an incident involving nuclear weapons in the area. 
Thirdly, by providing a framework for international cooperation in the complex 
and controversial field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Fourthly, by 
reducing tensions and rivalries within the area as well as restricting the 
involvement of external powers. Fifthly, by contributing to the construction of 
an international regime in which the political and strategic utility of nuclear 
weapons could be minimised. Sixthly, by setting an example which might 
demonstrate the feasibility of insulating certain geographical areas from the 
risks associated with nuclear deployment. 
The first proposals concerning NFZs were initially the expression of Soviet-
US controversy in Central Europe. The context underlying their formulation 
emerged as a result of successive decisions among which the admission of 
Germany to NATO in 1955, the 1957 decision of NATO's Council of Ministers 
concerning the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe, the introduction of 
Polaris submarines and the debate begun in 1961 over a multilateral nuclear 
force were the most important. 
A second round of proposals in the 1960s, including the Latin American 
initiative, partly reflected the aversion of a number of non-nuclear states to 
nuclear weapons and/or their determination to avoid nuclear testing by foreign 
powers in their territories. The linkage between these initiatives and the process 
of decolonisation, particularly in Africa, made clear that a full exercise of 
sovereignty would be required for the setting up of a nuclear-free zone. Such 
an agreement represented an attractive option to forward desires for national 
independence. These proposals were aimed at the long-term preservation of the 
non-nuclear status of recently decolonised states and at ensuring their 
disengagement from the East-West conflict. 
By contrast, a third stage was in fact subsumed in a world-wide non-
proliferation scheme accompanied by a decreasing interest in unilateral 
denuclearisation initiatives. A fourth and most recent revival of NFZ initiatives 
represents a reaffirmation of the parties' interest in remaining non-nuclear, in 
limiting or even avoiding the risks involved in military alliances, but most 
importantly, in preventing the emergence of regional nuclear powers. 
Although NFZs, emerging in a context of continued nuclear proliferation, 
have not enjoyed an absolute international consensus, nuclear powers and some 
non-nuclear states have generally shared the view that nuclear proliferation 
poses a serious threat to international security. The danger springs 
fundamentally from the implications of nuclear proliferation for the 
management of the central strategic balance and its tendency to increase the 
probability of accidents. 
It is difficult to deny that non-proliferation policies serve to rationalise and 
legitimise the existing distribution of power favouring the nuclear powers. This 
has been the claim of most non-nuclear states opposing non-proliferation 
policies, on the basis that these policies are aimed at the 'disarmament of the 
disarmed'. But it has gradually become clear that in confronting the 
international security dilemma, a discriminatory international framework might 
be the trade-off for avoiding the overwhelming dangers of a war between the 
major nuclear powers. This recognition has become the basis on which the 
control of nuclear proliferation has been widely accepted as a universal interest. 
As would become clear, the spread of nuclear weapons is greatly influenced 
- positively or negatively - by the military policies and broader political 
postures of the nuclear powers themselves. In the particular case of NFZs at 
least the tacit support of nuclear powers is a fundamental requirement for 
effective negotiation. In confronting nuclear proliferation the United States and 
the Soviet Union had to deal with conflicting objectives and policies: on the 
one hand, maintaining a distance between their central balance and the rest of 
the potentially increasing number of nuclear powers, and on the other, pursuing 
a public policy of minimising the political and military relevance of nuclear 
weapons. 
The only alternative to this dilemma has appeared to be the simultaneous and 
balanced pursuit of a stable mutual deterrence and of policies aimed at reducing 
the utility of nuclear arms such as restraints on both their own armaments and 
the political use of their nuclear arsenals. Following this line of analysis, it 
could be said that the first signs of mutual interests in controlling the nuclear 
arms race and nuclear proliferation were not a simple coincidence. The 
alternative of nuclear-free zones as a means of dealing with the latter problem, 
where it was perceived that geostrategic circumstances allowed for it, has been 
basically supported by both superpowers. 
The emergence of a proposal for a 
Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone 
Latin American participation in arms control during the 1950s was mostly 
restricted to occasional appeals to the United States and the Soviet Union to 
enter into effective negotiations. Despite the designation in 1951 of the 
Mexican diplomat, Luis Padilla Nervo, as president of the VI United Nations 
General Assembly, which was devoted to disarmament, throughout the region 
disarmament was seen primarily as a Soviet-US dialogue about the nuclear 
question.23 This partly explains the lack of Latin American proposals for 
regional arms control during these years. 
Several factors had contributed to a more active Latin American role in arms 
control negotiations by 1958. These included: 1) the acceptance by both 
superpowers of the widening of disarmament agencies; 2) the increasing 
pressure of international opinion for real achievements in the field of 
disarmament; and 3) the shift from general and complete disarmament to 
limited schemes in which regional disarmament, particularly for non-
proliferation purposes, played a significant role. 
Latin American disarmament initiatives in the postwar years took two 
different routes: one within the OAS, and the other in the United Nations within 
both the General Assembly and the 18 Nations Disarmament Committee 
(ENDC). The first initiatives taken to the regional forum explicitly shared the 
interests of the United States and could even be considered as US schemes put 
forward by Latin American proxies. Latin American reactions to these 
proposals ranged from open opposition to abstention or proposals to defer their 
discussion. 
The 1958 Costa Rican plan for regional denuclearisation 
In January 1958 at the Overseas Writers Club in New York, the Costa Rican 
ambassador and vice president of the Organisation of American States 
suggested the establishment of a special disarmament commission within that 
organisation to elaborate a disarmament project for the Latin American nations. 
G. Facio's proposal was actually based on a suggestion by US Secretary of the 
Treasury, Robert B. Anderson, that Latin American military expenditure be 
reduced. Initially, the US took a cautious attitude claiming that nuclear 
proliferation in the region, was 'out of proportion' and, in fact, avoiding 
addressing this question directly.24 
The Costa Rican plan addressed a number of issues. Notably, it sought to 
impose an obligation on Latin American states neither to manufacture nor to 
acquire nuclear weapons. The United States would commit itself not to sell or 
transfer nuclear weapons to Latin America and not to cooperate in the 
manufacture of such weapons. However, this commitment would not deny to 
the United States the right to negotiate the deployment of nuclear weapons if 
they were considered essential to hemispheric security. The Latin American 
states would also commit themselves not to buy any conventional arms outside 
the continent, while the American government would not allow any transfer of 
armaments beyond the minimum required for internal security. This quantity 
would be defined according to the size, population, borders and geographical 
characteristics of each country. Finally, Latin American countries could rely on 
the 'effective mechanisms' provided by the Rio Treaty in the event of an armed 
conflict.25 
It is understandable why the Costa Rican proposal was warmly received 
within the American Congress. Clearly, the initiative was fully consistent with 
US foreign policy towards the region in so far as it sought to prevent and 
exclude any external power from establishing a military presence in the 
hemisphere. Moreover, increasing evidence of Argentine and Brazilian efforts 
to develop a national nuclear capability had begun to awaken the concern of the 
US government.26 
At the time Senator Hubert Humphrey stated that Latin America could serve 
'as an example to the world'. But largely as the result of these enthusiastic 
expressions of American interest in the proposal, the suspicion of Latin 
American states about US motives was awakened. The political preponderance 
of the military in many Latin American countries impeded the acceptance of the 
proposed restrictions on domestic military policy. Moreover, despite the fact 
that a positive reading was possible among certain circles, many questioned the 
implications of the Costa Rican plan for the overall relations between the 
United States and Latin American countries. 
In a letter to Padilla Nervo, the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the 
Mexican ambassador to the OAS explained that the Costa Rican plan had been 
hastily sent to the various delegations in order to ensure that it coincided with 
the ordinary session of the Council of that organisation. Ambassador 
Quintanilla not only questioned the capacity of the Council to deal with issues 
with global implications, such as disarmament, which ought to fall under the 
jurisdiction of the United Nations, but emphasised the risk of dividing the OAS 
into two groups of states with different obligations. In a second letter 
Quintanilla concluded that such a division could lead to the failure of Latin 
American efforts both to defend the principle of legal equality among states and 
to contain the interventionist trends which had characterised American 
diplomacy in the region.27 
On 2 March 1958, three days before the presentation of the plan, the 
diplomatic battle had already started. The Mexican ambassador to the OAS 
began to mobilise Latin American opinion against the Costa Rican initiative, 
which was seen as a plan to 'weaken the weak, strengthen the strong' and 
ultimately reinforce US hegemony over the region. Similarly, the plan's 
presumption of Latin America's inability to produce nuclear weapons, together 
with its suggestion that actual or potential nuclear budgets be allocated to 
economic development, were interpreted as recognition of a potential regional 
capacity to develop nuclear weapons.28 
This potential capacity probably had already been envisaged both by the 
United States and by certain Latin American States. In the early 1950s 
Argentina had launched its nuclear programme, orienting it in 1957 towards an 
independent route to the development of nuclear energy.29 The Argentine 
nuclear programme had been inaugurated as early as 1950 by President Peron 
in accordance with earlier national policies aimed at the achievement of a 
strong military posture.30 Relations with the United States had been 
characterised by tensions originating in the policy of neutrality pursued by 
Argentina during the Second World War, a policy which not only reduced 
Argentina's access to US military aid but also reinforced the domestic position 
of the military seeking the development of a national arms industry. 
Only with the outbreak of the Korean War did Argentina begin reluctantly 
to reapproach the United States. The change of administration in the United 
States, together with persistent economic problems at home, led Peron to 
moderate his 'anti-American' policy and to ratify the Rio Treaty in order to 
become eligible for foreign aid. Nevertheless, this shift did not affect the 
traditional nationalist attitudes of a large number of military officers in 
Argentina.31 
Argentina's nuclear programme had accelerated after 1955 with the signature 
of agreements with the United States under the 'Atoms for Peace' programme 
which gave Argentina access to scientific information and training of nuclear 
scientists. However, from the early stages Argentina began steadily to pursue 
an independent nuclear route by developing natural uranium methods which 
enabled it to limit international control over its nuclear programme. 
Brazil's participation in a meeting between the United States and the Soviet 
Union among those countries with the highest uranium reserves, together with 
Argentina's bold incursion into the nuclear field, had awakened both the 
interest and concern of the Brazilian government. In 1951 the National 
Research Council was established in Brazil. This Council, together with the 
General Staff of the Armed Forces and the National Security Council, 
coordinated and controlled uranium exports.32 In 1953 Admiral Paulo Alberto, 
president of the National Research Council, met in West Germany with a group 
of scientists previously involved in the Nazi nuclear project and arranged for 
the purchase of uranium enrichment technology and the training of Brazilian 
scientists in Germany. 
This deal was discovered and blocked by American pressure on the German 
authorities and forced the resignation of Admiral Alberto in 1955. These events, 
together with the signing of agreements with the United States under the 
'Atoms for Peace' plan and the creation of a National Nuclear Energy 
Commission, marked the end of Brazilian efforts to develop an independent 
nuclear programme.33 
While Brazil's programme become gradually dependent upon and controlled 
through US assistance, Argentina continued its silent march.34 In 1957 the 
National Atomic Energy Commission had decided to ban imports of research 
reactors and nuclear fuels in order to encourage national production. The 
rationale behind this policy had been, as Jorge Sabato later stated, not only to 
make those reactors a 'tool for training and research, but to allow Argentina to 
develop its own capacity for nuclear engineering'.35 Priority was given to 
domestic production of reactors and fuel material in order to develop a national 
nuclear engineering capability and an infrastructure conducive to training and 
testing. In 1958, as the result of these decisions, Argentina emerged as the first 
Latin American state to operate a research nuclear reactor. 
The 1958 Costa Rican plan was opposed by Mexican Ambassador 
Quintanilla who questioned the competence of the OAS to deal with what 
appeared mainly as a Latin American agreement and underlined the 
implications of such an agreement for the emergence of two different types of 
American states, 'police states and protected states'.36 Although since 1955, 
with the establishment of the National Nuclear Energy Commision, Mexico had 
shown interest in developing a nuclear energy programme, Mexican opposition 
to the Costa Rican plan primarily responded to what was perceived simply as 
US interventionism and by no means to fears about its implications for 
Mexico's nuclear energy autonomy.37 
In the United States the failure of the Costa Rican initiative was seen as a 
lost opportunity for Latin America to 'give a useful lesson to the world', 
particularly given its favourable situation whereby the United States provided 
a protective nuclear shield.38 
The 1959 arms limitation proposal 
A second important Latin American disarmament initiative had its origins in a 
number of statements made by Chilean President Alessandri in the UN in 
November 1959. Earlier that year, during the meeting of ministers of foreign 
affairs, the United States had requested Latin American states to reduce military 
expenditure to the levels required by national and hemispheric defence.39 
Alessandri's initiative also questioned the potential implications of arms 
trade for Latin America, which 'should not be the consuming market of 
armaments beyond the reasonable limits for defence against aggression'.40 
Alessandri's proposal was immediately supported by the President of Peru, 
Manuel Prado, who proposed to study means of limiting arms to essential 
defence needs in order to release additional resources for economic 
development. Implicit in Peru's support was its interest in avoiding a Chilean-
Peruvian arms race. 
The Chilean initiative calling for a specialised conference on regional arms 
limitation, unlike the previous Costa Rican plan, was generally accepted by all 
the countries of the region. The United States approved these Latin American 
efforts but, reacting to increasing Latin American arms purchases in the 
European arms market, hastily began to implement a law to lend or make 
available to 'friendly nations' destroyers, destroyer escorts and submarines. The 
main justification for this decision was the urgent need to strengthen 
hemispheric defence. The countries included within this scheme were 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay.41 Not 
surprisingly the programme was criticised in several Latin American states on 
the grounds that it conflicted with the much publicised American interest in 
curbing Latin American defence budgets so that more funds for economic 
development could be available. Moreover, the emergence of a wave of 
democratic reformism leading to the resignation in 1956 of General Manuel 
Odrfa in Peru, the fall of Rojas Pinilla's dictatorship in Colombia and that of 
Perez Jimenez in Venezuela in 1958, as well as the increasing signs that 
Batista's rule was disintegrating in Cuba, led to the creation of a Latin 
American front against military regimes. In this context the US decision was 
perceived as weakening the cohesion needed for a fruitful discussion of limited 
military budgets in the forthcoming Inter-American Conference. 
Latin American participation in United Nations disarmament 
negotiations 
1958 marked Latin America's debut into UN disarmament debates, starting 
with the intervention of the Mexican representative recommending the creation 
of a permanent and specialised agency to deal with the problem of 
disarmament. The underlying purpose was to revitalise disarmament efforts 
within the United Nations and to break down the East-West disarmament 
deadlock. The expansion of the Disarmament Commission, to include all UN 
members, together with the reorientation of disarmament debates in those years 
to partial disarmament measures - such as suspension of nuclear tests, a 
banning on the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, and 
regional disarmament schemes - opened new paths to the participation of non-
nuclear states in arms control negotiations.42 
In that year the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs affirmed in the General 
Assembly that disarmament should be a total process encompassing all types 
of weaponry: conventional and nuclear arms, control systems as well as 
measures to prevent surprise attacks. In contrast with previous occasions he 
then recognised that although disarmament depended mainly upon the great 
powers, to the extent that the survival of all states was at stake it was now a 
matter of collective responsibility. 
In subsequent speeches Padilla Nervo emphasised the need to resume 
negotiations in the Disarmament Commission and to set up a specialised organ 
to ensure the continuity of negotiations. These speeches addressed the main 
issues discussed during the disarmament negotiations of those years: nuclear 
tests, the risk of nuclear proliferation, and the problems of inspection and 
verification. What we can see in Padilla Nervo's statements is a gradual change 
from a view of disarmament mainly as the concern of great powers to one 
seeing it as the collective responsibility of all states. Yet the role envisaged for 
most states was clearly limited to that of moderators and promoters of this goal. 
The idea of the potential disarmament of these states, nuclear or conventional, 
was scarcely touched upon.43 
Responding to the demands of the Disarmament Commission, its elected 
president, the Mexican ambassador Padilla Nervo, attended the 1959 inaugural 
session of the newly created Ten Power Disarmament Committee. His presence 
expressed the increasing interests in establishing permanent links between the 
two agencies. In that period the agenda of the General Assembly reflected the 
increasing concern of international opinion about the impasse in disarmament 
negotiations, the environmental effects of nuclear tests, the use by the 
superpowers of other nations' territories for nuclear testing, and finally, the 
risks of wider dissemination of nuclear arms. The increasing pressure of 
international opinion on both superpowers to show signs of serious commitment 
to disarmament negotiations, the lack of flexibility of negotiations partly 
resulting from the Cold War context in which they took place, and the demands 
of non-nuclear states to participate in disarmament negotiations help to explain 
the joint superpower decision to expand the TPDC, to continue negotiations in 
successive and balanced stages and to set the date for the meeting of the 
Disarmament Commission.44 
A 1960 Canadian resolution coincided with the Mexican view on the need 
to preserve and reactivate UN disarmament responsibilities. In both proposals 
the idea of dealing with disarmament on a regional basis was raised for the first 
time. The economic implications of disarmament represented the point of 
departure of the new Mexican position which, by recognising the need for 
coordinated efforts towards regional disarmament, significantly contrasted with 
the one held by Mexico in 1958 within the OAS. 
In September 1961 the general economic implications of disarmament were 
addressed in a UN report on the economic and social consequences of 
disarmament. This report covered transition and conversion problems, expected 
benefits and particular case analyses.45 In the same month, the United States 
and the Soviet Union issued a joint declaration informing General Assembly 
members of their exchange of views on questions related to disarmament and 
of their decision immediately to resume negotiations in an appropriate body 
whose composition had yet to be agreed.46 
By the end of that year a joint resolution by Austria, Libya, Sweden, and 
Sudan among other countries again emphasised the urgent need to suspend 
nuclear tests and expressed their concern about the potential increase in the 
number of nuclear powers. This resolution included a suggestion to carry out 
a survey about the conditions in which non-nuclear states would be willing to 
renounce any military nuclear status.47 
The composition of the Committee of Disarmament was finally agreed by 
both superpowers in December 1961. The TPDC would become the 18 Nations 
Disarmament Committee (ENDC), which included Brazil and Mexico among 
other new members. The apparent confusion in the selection of new members 
awakened the dissatisfaction of a number of delegations, like that of Argentina 
which affirmed its pleasure with the participation of two Latin American 
nations in the committee, but strongly criticised the discriminatory character of 
selection procedures.48 
The ENDC began its work in March 1962. The first intervention of the 
Mexican delegate took up some of the points of a Soviet-American declaration 
of 1959 giving clear priority to effective mechanisms for the peaceful solution 
of international disputes. Padilla Nervo again reaffirmed the role of non-nuclear 
states within the committee simply as moderators and mediators to encourage 
the great powers 'not to be dismayed by the magnitude of the disarmament 
problem'. This limited role had been promoted by the Mexican delegation 
within the UN Disarmament Commission since 1958, while serious scepticism 
continued to permeate the Mexican view of partial arms control measures. 
Mexican opposition to any nuclear experiment for military purposes was used 
to justify its abstention from partial denuclearised initiatives. Yet the Mexican 
delegate stated his support for unilateral decisions aimed at preserving non-
nuclear status, such as the decision recently taken by the Mexican government 
to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons and to prohibit any nuclear 
weapon within the national territory.49 Rather than offering a means of dealing 
with the problem of nuclear proliferation, the Mexican position revealed 
particular interest in the possible links between denuclearisation and national 
independence. 
The sessions of the Conference of the Committee of Disarmament held 
between March and September 1962, the date of its annual recess, were mainly 
devoted to the negotiation of a nuclear test ban treaty.50 The incorporation of 
the group of non-aligned nations into the committee was based on the 
increasingly widespread recognition that nuclear disarmament concerned not 
only states possessing nuclear weapons, but all nations. However, their 
performance remained limited to moral appeals to the nuclear powers to 
suspend nuclear testing and their participation to the establishment of impartial 
control delegations. 
The Brazilian and Mexican delegations, together with those of other non-
aligned states, basically played a mediating role between the nuclear powers. 
By July 1962 the impasse in the negotiations towards a test ban agreement led 
the Mexican ambassador to propose a change in direction towards 'collateral 
disarmament measures' such as non-proliferation, measures to diminish the 
risks of surprise attack, and even a partial test ban treaty limited to atmospheric 
tests.51 The first period of sessions came to its end in September 1962 with an 
apparent consensus about the need for a partial test ban treaty to prohibit 
nuclear tests in the atmosphere, the oceans and outer space, while leaving the 
problem of underground detections for subsequent negotiations. 
On 20 September 1962 the possibility of a Latin American nuclear-free zone 
was for the first time raised by Melo Franco, the Brazilian representative to the 
UNGA. Melo Franco affirmed that Brazil would support the establishment of 
NFZs as long as they remained detached from Cold War rivalries, and 
concluded his statement by suggesting that Latin America could constitute one 
such zone. A month later, and few days before Kennedy's disclosure of the 
discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba, Padilla Nervo presented to the UNGA a 
resolution asking the superpowers to reach an immediate agreement on nuclear 
tests. This resolution mentioned only the positive effects that such an agreement 
would have on collateral issues such as non-proliferation, NFZs, and the pacific 
use of outer space. In responding to the Brazilian proposal Padilla Nervo again 
followed a cautious line, stating that denuclearisation should be a free and 
unilateral decision of individual states - as it had been for Mexico - and that 
NFZs could only be regarded as transitory and partial measures. 
Brazil's proposal came only after a second unsuccessful effort to assert the 
independence of its nuclear programme. In 1961 the head of the National 
Energy Commission, Marcelo Damy da Souza, had tried to achieve greater 
autonomy by looking for French support in the construction of a natural 
uranium reactor.52 This effort had ended with the resignation of President 
Quadros and with the French decision to give up natural uranium methods in 
favour of the American approach.53 In Argentina, although no crucial 
decisions were taken at the time, the government remained committed to the 
goal of nuclear independence. 
The Brazilian proposal was made a short time after the Inter-American 
system had experienced a major crisis and just before the Cuban missile crisis. 
The first owed its origins to the parallel trends leading to Cuba's regional 
isolation and to its increasing closeness to the Soviet Union. While the events 
leading to these developments are not essential to this study, the effects and 
implications of the Cuban position for the Inter-American system provided the 
context for the consideration of regional denuclearisation by Latin American 
states. 
In August 1960, just after the VI Inter-American Conference had adopted a 
number of sanctions against the Dominican Republic, the VII Conference 
adopted a resolution concerning 'communist presence' in the region. This 
resolution caused a crisis of consensus which was resolved only because of the 
abstract terms in which its final version was phrased and its avoidance of any 
direct reference to Cuba.54 
The impact of the Cuban missile crisis 
After the Bay of Pigs fiasco of April 1961 Cuba's pro-Soviet alignment became 
explicit. Soviet support for Castro had gradually increased to the point of 
linking Cuba's defence with Soviet nuclear capability once the 1960 U-2 
incident had set the limits to a settlement in Berlin. Despite the rhetorical 
character of Khrushchev's threats, as confirmed by the Bay of Pigs, their 
significance derived from the fact that for the first time the Soviet Union 
explicitly committed itself to defend the island with nuclear weapons. In his 
1960 nuclear commitment Khrushchev had stated: 
Soviet artillery men, in case of need, can with their missile fire support 
the Cuban people if the aggressive forces of the Pentagon dare begin 
intervention against Cuba. And let those in the Pentagon not forget that 
as recent tests have shown, we have missiles capable of striking 
accurately [ . . . ] That is, if you like a warning to those who would like 
to settle international issues by force and not by reason.55 
Although Soviet statements promising to support Cuba did not constitute a 
formal commitment to go to war with the United States in case of aggression 
to Cuba, they clearly carried that implication. The rationale behind this policy 
was probably linked to both internal and external objectives. If Soviet 
reassurances appeared effectively to have deterred the United States from 
attacking Cuba, Khrushchev would have gained political prestige both within 
the Soviet Union and in the struggle for the leadership of international 
communism. 
After the abortive Bay of Pigs intervention Soviet statements concerning the 
defence of Cuba became more frequent, arousing US attention. Evidence of this 
is provided by the debate about the implications of eventual Soviet deployments 
in the island. In the summer of 1961 Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, mentioned the possibility of Soviet missile 
bases and air bases in Cuba: 
I suppose we would all be less comfortable if the Soviets did install 
missile bases in Cuba, but I am not sure that our national existence would 
be in substantially greater danger than is the case today.56 
The increasing radicalisation of Castro's regime led the VIII Inter-American 
Conference of January 1962 to adopt two resolutions calling for the 
implementation of sanctions against Cuba and its expulsion from the 
Organisation of American States. This Conference witnessed a realignment of 
Latin American states towards favouring Cuban isolation. The Mexican position 
was illustrative of this trend, in which the earlier enthusiastic sympathy for the 
Cuban Revolution was gradually replaced by an increasingly cautious 
diplomacy.57 
The policy of open confrontation with Cuba adopted by the United States 
and its Latin American allies responded to the internal character of the Castro 
regime and its alliance with the Soviet Union. Despite the initial consideration 
given to the implications of an eventual Soviet-Cuban military alliance, up to 
1962 American perceptions of the Cuban threat were linked mainly to Castro's 
support for revolutionary movements in the hemisphere rather than to a 
significant Soviet military menace. As late as September 1962 the US 
Intelligence Board continued to consider Soviet emplacement of missiles in 
Cuba as a highly unlikely prospect. This estimation helps to explain the 
apparent surprise with which the Kennedy administration met its first 
recognition of missile sites on the island on 14 October 1962. 
Several tentative explanations for the Soviet decision have been offered, 
among which the achievement of strategic parity has been considered as the 
most satisfactory. On the Cuban side explanations have generally referred to 
both domestic and external purposes of the emplacement. In the domestic arena 
the decision to deploy missiles could 'reinforce and confirm Castro's defiance 
of the Northern Colossus, make more persuasive his warnings of an American 
invasion and distract attention from gathering difficulties at home'. Externally, 
'Russian missiles in Cuba . . . would deter the United States invasion and 
therefore prevent nuclear war altogether'.
The discovery of missiles in Cuba confronted the United States with equally 
uncomfortable alternatives. Accepting the new status quo, on the basis of no 
radical increase in vulnerability having occurred, involved the risk of a future 
reversal in the strategic balance in favour of the Soviet Union. Exerting 
diplomatic pressure on both the Soviet Union and Cuba seemed unlikely to 
prove successful. And on the other hand, it was extremely difficult to assess the 
risks of any use of force, from surgical strikes to invasion. 
After assessing each one of these difficult options, a blockade was chosen 
as the one involving fewest risks. It offered a firm middle course between 
inaction and attack, it would place on Khrushchev the responsibility for the 
decision to escalate to the next step, it would enable the United States to take 
advantage of its local preponderance, and finally to exploit the threat of 
subsequent non-nuclear steps in each of which the United States would enjoy 
significant superiority. 
The defensive quarantine offered the additional advantage of potential legal 
support as long as it was authorised by the OAS under the terms of the Rio 
Treaty. Article 52 of the UN Charter stated that regional arrangements could 
deal with 'such matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security as are 
appropriate for regional action'. The OAS, acting under articles 6 and 8 of the 
Rio Treaty, could take measures including a recommendation for the use of 
force to meet a situation that endangered the peace of the hemisphere. One of 
the considerations often mentioned as inclining Kennedy towards the blockade 
option was that it could be carried out within the framework of the regional 
organisation and the Rio Treaty. Having US actions publicly justified in law 
became a factor 'operating differentially to favour quarantine'.59 
On 23 October 1962 the Council of the OAS adopted a resolution calling for 
individual and collective measures, including the use of force, to achieve the 
removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. The blockade proved successful: it 
represented a course of action from which the Soviets were able to read US 
determination. It prevented miscalculations of the firm but limited objectives 
of the United States government while granting the Soviets an opportunity to 
retreat with some measure of dignity.60 The experience of this crisis enabled 
both superpowers directly to confront the risks of a nuclear confrontation. As 
Allison has put it: 
The United States was firm but forebearing. The Soviet Union looked 
hard and then withdrew without humiliation. Here is one of the finest 
examples of diplomatic prudence. Having peered over the edge of nuclear 
precipice, both nations edged backward towaid detente.61 
The Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone reconsidered 
The US proposal for a blockade was the first resolution unanimously adopted 
by all members of the Organisation of American States. This alignment was 
possibly the result of the perception of a real threat by all Latin American 
states. Yet this did not prevent the expression of independence by Bolivia, 
Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay who raised reservations and even abstained from 
portions of the resolution. This was particularly the case in relation to the 
clause authorising further action in addition to the quarantine in case the latter 
proved ineffective. Mexico expressed its view that support for the American 
resolution did not expand the constitutional authority of the executive within 
the OAS to despatch armed forces without the previous consent of their 
respective legislatures.62 Even though the Mexican government accepted the 
absolute need to react to the threat, it expressed doubts as to the full legality of 
the blockade.63 
On 29 October, only one day after Khrushchev had announced that the 
Soviet missiles would be withdrawn from Cuba, Brazil again presented its 
resolution for a Latin American nuclear-free zone. This time the resolution was 
intended both to offer a solution to the crisis and to prevent future similar risks. 
It emphasised that 'the development and evolution of the current international 
situation seem to favour the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new 
geographical areas'. By referring to previous efforts it again made an appeal to 
both Latin American and African nations to consider the creation of NFZs in 
their respective continents and asked nuclear powers to abstain from using the 
territorial seas of African and Latin American countries to test, stockpile or 
transport nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery systems.64 
The debates that followed the presentation of the resolution took place in the 
aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. The Cuban representative defined Cuba's 
long term position towards the initiative, namely the expression of sympathy 
while emphasising the 'contradictory reality' granting the United States the 
privilege to deploy nuclear weapons in key points of Latin America such as 
Panama and Puerto Rico. The American representative, Dean, affirmed that his 
government would support Latin American efforts to establish a NFZ as long 
as verification guarantees were included to ensure the fulfilment of the 
obligations. 
Despite expressions of sympathy a high number of abstentions was expected 
in the vote on the resolution, including Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela. 
The Mexican delegation criticised the hasty presentation of the proposal and 
made its support conditional upon the development of 'more favourable 
conditions'. Further evidence of the limited Mexican interest in the initiative 
was reflected in Padilla Nervo's speech delivered at the General Assembly the 
following day, which was completely centred on the nuclear tests issue and 
failed to mention the question of regional denuclearisation. This unfavourable 
climate led the Brazilian delegate, Melo Franco, to recognise that more time 
was required before proceeding to the vote on the resolution.65 
The Brazilian resolution was revised and again presented to the General 
Assembly in November of that year jointly with Bolivia and Chile. Essentially, 
the main points remained untouched but, as the result of American pressure, the 
joint demand for NFZs in Africa and Latin America was reduced to a Latin 
American initiative which vaguely mentioned the 1961 resolution for an 
African nuclear-free zone as a source of inspiration.66 
Contrasting with its previous opposition, in January 1963 the Mexican 
government took up the Latin American initiative. In a letter to the Mexican 
ambassador in Brazil, Alfonso Garcia Robles, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Manuel Tello sent his instructions for the negotiation of a joint declaration by 
Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador to declare Latin America a NFZ. 
In March 1963 a letter from president Lopez Mateos was sent to Brazil's 
President J. Goulart, to Jorge Alessandri of Chile, to President Arozemena of 
Ecuador and to Victor Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia. The letter carried the 
initiative for the joint declaration and for an agreement among the five states 
unilaterally or through a multilateral agreement to commit themselves not to 
acquire nuclear weapons, nor to permit their presence nor the installation of 
launching bases within their national territories. 
The Brazilian reaction was immediate and enthusiastic. The initiative was 
considered an 'excellent opportunity' and a practical step of great value. In his 
reply to the Mexican President, President Goulart mentioned the logical and 
natural identification of Brazil, given its efforts in disarmament, with the 
Mexican initiative.67 President Alessandri shared the Brazilian enthusiasm 'to 
keep Latin America out of the nuclear struggle' and underlined the consistency 
of Chilean disarmament policy. Signalling subsequent reluctance to support the 
proposal, Argentina considered the declaration 'inopportune' and advised the 
parties to enter into immediate diplomatic contacts. 
The Mexican government counted on US support which was signalled by 
Senator Humprey's declaration stating that Latin American denuclearisation 
should have priority in the diplomatic agenda of that region.68 The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs started diplomatic consultations with the American 
government through its embassy in Washington. Generally speaking, the 
initiative was widely supported and few comments were made in relation to the 
control system, the relation of the agreement with the UN and the OAS, and the 
question of Cuban participation. With respect to Panama and Puerto Rico, 
Martin, the Assistant Secretary of the State Department, clearly affirmed that 
the United States had no objections as long as the transit of nuclear weapons 
through the Panama Canal could be excluded from the agreement.69 
The Latin American states party to the declaration decided to make it public 
on 29 April 1963. This event was followed by letters to the remaining Latin 
American states inviting them to adhere to it, though Puerto Rico and French 
and British Guyana were initially excluded.70 The Mexican delegation in the 
Geneva Committee of Disarmament, headed by Padilla Nervo, received 
instructions from the Minister of Foreign Affairs as late as 26 April to transmit 
the text of the declaration jointly with his Brazilian colleague.71 
The resolution was presented in the Committee in May 1963. The Latin 
American declaration mentioned as motivating factors concern over the 
propagation of nuclear weapons, the Latin American tradition of peaceful 
settlement of disputes and regional cooperation, as well as the desire to protect 
the region from the 'tragic consequences of a nuclear war'. After pointing to 
the impasse which had been reached on nuclear disarmament negotiations and 
the need for a 'categorical solution', the declaration announced the decision of 
the parties to sign a multilateral agreement to commit themselves not to 
manufacture, accept, stockpile or test nuclear weapons or launching devices and 
to cooperate among themselves in making Latin America a recognised NFZ. 
The declaration was positively received by all parties on the committee. The 
US representative referred to US support for the efforts of some Latin 
American states to create a NFZ in the region since November 1962. At the 
same time, the State Department affirmed that the initiative expressed concern 
over nuclear proliferation, a problem which had been considered of primary 
significance.72 The official US position towards NFZs regarded these as part 
of collateral disarmament measures, which under appropriate circumstances 
could contribute to the avoidance of nuclear proliferation. Concerning the Latin 
American initiative, US official statements appealed for the immediate 
crystallisation of the initiative in a multilateral agreement to define the nature 
and achievement of the project. 
The British delegation expressed its support for the initiative but raised 
doubts as to the usefulness of similar agreements in Europe, where 
denuclearisation could seriously affect the military balance.73 For its part, the 
Soviet delegation stated that the initiative reflected the legitimate desire of 
Latin American states to protect the continent from the risks of nuclear war. In 
its view the initiative deserved careful examination since it offered a way to 
deal with the constant threat of further proliferation.74 Even though both 
eastern and western countries expressed their support for the Latin American 
initiative, a more general scepticism about the possibilities of denuclearisation 
in other areas was also apparent.75 
The Latin American response to the declaration was partly conditioned by 
the perception that it was an initiative coming from the five Latin American 
nations which still had diplomatic relations with Cuba. Despite this, the place 
of Cuba within the project was not clearly defined. On the one hand, the 
declaration was interpreted as having the intention of reopening Cuba's access 
to the regional system. On the other, the State Department's declarations to the 
effect that the Cuban regime was incompatible with the inter-American system 
and that Cuban participation was dependent upon Soviet permission, were 
intended as diplomatic pressure. This was based on the mistaken assumption 
that by forcing the Cuban government to define its position towards the 
initiative its lack of independence would become clear. In the rest of Latin 
America the relatively strong influence of the military at the governmental level 
helps to explain the scepticism with which the initiative was received. These 
groups would clearly oppose any initiative which could restrict their power and 
influence. 
The Central American states sent a cautious reply explaining that their 
governments had decided to postpone their comments until after joint 
consultation. Peru expressed its support but made it conditional upon the 
consideration of the regional pacts and agreements, while Haiti announced its 
immediate support. The diplomatic approach to Cuba followed standard 
diplomatic channels and Cuba's reply offered to study the proposal carefully. 
The Cuban position was linked to the one taken in relation to the newly 
agreed Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in October 1963, namely, to an ending 
of US policies of 'undeclared war'. The Cuban representative stated that his 
government was not 'on principle opposed to the creation of NFZs' and linked 
the effectiveness of the Latin American effort to the position of the 'only 
nuclear power in the continent'. Cuba would not accept any denuclearisation 
commitment if this excluded Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal, while its 
support was made dependent upon devolution to Cuba of the Guantanamo 
military base. 
The Argentine official position was made public in May 1963, expressing an 
uncommitted interest and a clear preference to take negotiations into the OAS 
in order to establish proper links with the inter-American framework for the 
defence of the continent.76 For its part, the Colombian government declared 
the need to ensure the superpowers' commitment to respecting the agreement. 
The decision whether to choose the universal or regional forum in which to 
conduct negotiations was complicated by the absence of both Cuba and Bolivia 
from the OAS. Acknowledging these complications the authors of the 
declaration expressed their interest in the United Nations. This decision was 
further reinforced by the problem posed by Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and 
Belize, whose juridical links with the regional organisation had yet to be 
defined. Both the Mexican and the Brazilian Ministries of Foreign Affairs were 
conscious of the gradual and slow nature of the negotiations and were therefore 
prepared to reconcile patience and determination.77 
By September 1963 the Brazilian representative in the UN clarified the status 
of the negotiations for the NFZ: the zone would not be the result of a General 
Assembly declaration but of some sort of agreement reached among the Latin 
American nations themselves. Garcia Robles, the Mexican Ambassador, stated 
that the establishment of a Latin American NFZ would represent an affirmation 
of the independence of those nations, and that in the current strategic 
conditions, with the dominant role of intercontinental missiles, it would not 
affect the strategic balance and could even contribute to stability by preventing 
new risks of the magnitude of the Cuban crisis. 
The decision to present the declaration to the General Assembly expressed 
the desire of Latin American states for the support of that organisation and their 
interest in encouraging similar measures in other regions of the world. A slight 
change stressing the genuine Latin American origins of the initiative was the 
result of a US suggestion of November 1963. In that month the United States 
had clearly stated that its conditions for the acceptance of the regional 
agreement were that the decision rested with Latin American states themselves 
and included all nations in the area, and that adequate verification measures 
were provided.78 The prospects of French support were complicated by its 
refusal to play an active role in any resolutions concerning nuclear arms or 
tests, while the Soviet Union made its support conditional on the willingness 
of the United States fully to endorse the resolution, namely, to remove nuclear 
weapons and military bases from the area.79 Despite its traditional support for 
NFZs the Soviet commitment to the initiative was clearly contrained by its 
support for the Cuban regime. Evidence of this was provided by its decision to 
abstain in a UN resolution to initiate a study for the denuclearisation of Latin 
America. On 27 November 1963 the General Assembly finally adopted 
resolution 1911 (XVIII) on Latin American denuclearisation with 91 votes in 
favour, no vote against and 15 abstentions including Cuba and Venezuela. 
There is little doubt that the Cuban missile crisis was the catalyst leading to 
a collective Latin American denuclearisation effort. US interest in the initiative 
was unquestionably reinforced by this event, but, as mentioned earlier it can 
actually be traced through US diplomatic concerns dating back to the late 
1950s. The negotiation of the Tlatelolco Treaty was a complicated process 
which took place in the context of the rise to preeminence of a new generation 
of military regimes influencing the position of key parties. 
The negotiation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
Negotiations started in November 1964 with an initial preparatory meeting 
(REUPRAL) followed by the setting up of a commission for Latin American 
denuclearisation. The workings of this commission took place over four periods 
between 1965 and February 1967 when the Treaty of Tlatelolco was opened to 
signature. The process of negotiations revealed the existence of contentious 
issues shaping the final text of the agreement, among which, Cuban 
participation, geographical definition, decolonisation, the right to peaceful 
nuclear explosions, and the nuclear powers' guarantees were the most 
important. 
Although the Argentine and Brazilian positions endorsed the view that 
nuclear proliferation endangers international security, they also challenged the 
existing distribution of power, with a permanent Soviet-US nuclear hegemony. 
This dilemma was reflected in the text of the treaty in a compromise formula 
between those who acknowledged the need to accept this cost and those who 
like Argentina and Brazil made clear their reluctance. 
In September 1963, in an informal meeting, the representatives of the states 
party to the 1963 declaration discussed the main issues in the negotiation of an 
agreement to establish a NFZ in Latin America. UNGA resolution 1911 (XVIII) 
of that year had secured UN support and had also reaffirmed the 'free and 
sovereign decision' of Latin American states.80 
The background of the negotiation of the treaty was dominated by the 
interplay of Cuban alignment with the Soviet Union and Kennedy's unveiling, 
in March 1961, of the Alliance for Progress, which led to Cuban regional 
isolation. Through the Alliance for Progress the promotion of pro-western 
democratic institutions and economic development was intended to create the 
necessary conditions for stability and ultimately for the defence of the continent 
against internal and external communist threats.81 During the 1960s the pattern 
of US-Latin American relations set by the Alliance for Progress, particularly 
during the Johnson administration, led to the emergence both of an indirect US 
military presence, and, most importantly, of a new generation of highly 
politicised Latin American military institutions and personnel.82 Perhaps the 
main influence of the Alliance was the bolstering of the military's self 
confidence as an institution capable of managing social and economic 
change.83 As would become apparent this factor strengthened the position of 
those sectors favouring nuclearisation. 
The 1962 military coups against Presidents Frondizi of Argentina and 
Manuel Prado in Peru had signalled the limits of Kennedy's Latin American 
policy, yet the actual test came with subsequent events in Guatemala and 
Brazil. Whereas in Guatemala the prospect of a right wing military regime was 
not sufficient reason to persuade the United States to support a reformist leader, 
in Brazil, Kennedy had already decided that 'he would not be averse to the 
overthrow of the elected Brazilian government by forces more friendly to the 
United States'.84 Although pressures on Goulart's government mounted with 
the Johnson administration, by March 1963 the CIA was not only aware of 
plans being prepared by conservative military factions to depose Goulart but 
had even concluded that the coup's main figure, Odylio Denis, would need 
'considerably more support than we can now credit to him to bring off a 
successful coup'.85 Goulart's government was finally overthrown in April 
1964 with a US Navy task force approaching Brazilian coasts '. . . en route 
Porto Alegre and Rio Grande to blockade exiting ships' and to provide oil 
supplies to the military.86 These dramatic events would prove to be crucial in 
the course taken by Brazil in relation to the development of nuclear energy. 
The Cuban factor became a constant source of disagreement between the 
United States and those Latin American states convinced that Castro's pro-
Soviet alignment could still be reversed through a policy of regional incentives. 
Yet this posture was gradually undermined, first by Castro's triumphant visit 
to Moscow in May 1963, followed by a joint declaration recognising Cuba as 
a full member of the 'great socialist community', and finally by Cuban support 
to guerrilla movements throughout the region.87 Despite this, and partly 
encouraged by the emerging detente between the two superpowers with the 
signature of the PTBT, during 1963 and 1964 Castro made several cautious 
moves aimed at normalising relations with the United States.88 The apparently 
favourable reaction of the Kennedy administration was subsequently replaced 
by an uncompromising posture accompanied by a policy of intimidation ranging 
from systematic reconnaissance flights over the island, to plans to assassinate 
Fidel Castro.89 
Cuba's diplomatic isolation was further enhanced in July 1964 by the 
decision taken by the OAS to impose economic sanctions and to break 
diplomatic relations with Cuba. With only four votes against - Mexico, 
Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia - and Argentina's abstention, Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk concluded that it had been the 'most important conference ever held 
in the hemisphere' and added that 'Castro has no future in Cuba or in this 
hemisphere'.90 
In this inter-American climate the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs 
decided in November 1964 to send an invitation to Latin American states to 
participate in a preliminary meeting on Latin American denuclearisation. 
Earlier, in February of that year, in a meeting between Dean Rusk, Thomas 
Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and Manuel 
Tello, the Mexican Foreign Minister, Rusk had expressed his disappointment 
that the proposal for a Latin American NFZ had not prospered. More 
significantly, Rusk also informed the Mexican diplomat about informal 
conversations with the Soviet Union during which the latter had made clear its 
support for the initiative while admitting its failure to convince Cuba.91 
The question of nuclear non-proliferation remained an international priority 
throughout 1964. The US considered practicable proposals of non-
dissemination, non-reception of nuclear weapons, non-transfer of strategic 
delivery systems, NFZs and nuclear limited zones.92 But also in September of 
that year the Second Non-Aligned Conference included in its agenda the 
question of NFZs and the prevention of further dissemination of nuclear 
weapons. Despite the Johnson administration's unsympathetic view of this 
conference, instructions were sent to US embassies in Cairo and New Delhi to 
express US support for the Latin American NFZ proposal and to similar 
measures designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.93 At the time the 
superpowers' public discussion of non-proliferation mainly focused on the 
disagreement over a Multilateral Force, considered by the United States to be 
a measure designed to inhibit further proliferation in Europe and by the Soviet 
Union to comprise the actual dissemination of nuclear weapons.94 
In Latin America, US reconsideration admitting the Panama Canal to the 
NFZ appeared to be caused by two factors: the apparent deal with the Soviet 
Union mentioned above, and the ending of diplomatic relations by the 
Panamanian government in January 1964. Inclusion of the canal was probably 
considered as a US offer to the government of President Chiari which had 
demanded the negotiation of a new canal treaty as a condition of the resumption 
of diplomatic relations.95 
Despite changes of administration in Mexico in December of that year it 
seemed that continuity in Mexico's leading role could be expected. 
Geographical, historical, economic and political factors influenced Mexico's 
foreign policy giving rise to the priority attached to the bilateral relationship 
with the United States. This priority was particularly clear during the 1960s, 
though subsequently there were attempts to achieve greater autonomy. What 
seems clear is that, given the crucial role played by legality in Mexico's foreign 
policy, participation in arms control offered a forum free of conflict with the 
United States, and equally importantly, a significant source of international 
prestige.96 This was particularly the case after Mexico's incorporation into the 
ENDC in 1962. Moreover, with regard to regional denuclearisation the United 
States had already expressed its interest and support and had even encouraged 
Mexican leadership in this direction. To both the Lopez Mateos and Diaz Ordaz 
administrations the pursuit of this goal undoubtedly offered more benefits than 
costs. 
The four rounds leading to the negotiation of a treaty spread over a four year 
period in which major changes took place both in the wider international 
context and at the levels of regional and domestic politics. A period of relative 
instability seemed to be on the way with Soviet leadership changes leading to 
Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, together with China's first nuclear detonation and 
increasing escalation of the war in Vietnam. At the regional level Latin 
American politics was characterised by convulsive change with recurrent waves 
of military coups. By the time the Mexican Foreign Ministry launched the 
formal request to Latin American governments in November 1964, the main 
obstacles to the achievement of a Latin American NFZ were already clear. 
Firstly, given the state of US-Cuban relations, it seemed that Cuba's 
participation in a Latin American NFZ would be highly unlikely. Secondly, 
earlier Brazilian support for a preliminary meeting disappeared after the 1964 
military coup which led to the inauguration of Branco's government. The new 
government was determined to change Brazil's position in the negotiations for 
a Latin American NFZ and to follow a more cautious approach based upon 
considerations linked to Brazil's freedom of action.97 
The new Brazilian attitude reflected a change of views concerning nuclear 
issues. In contrast with the traditional role played by the military as guarantors 
of the Brazilian constitution, the 1964 coup opened a long period of direct 
military intervention in politics. The Castello Branco government was 
characterised by its 'apolitical and technical' approach to Brazilian problems. 
The military emerged as the institution responsible for maintaining political 
stability so that a new coalition of apolitical technocrats could promote 
economic development and institutional modernisation. These factors led to a 
reassessment of nuclear issues which emphasised the use of nuclear energy to 
meet Brazilian energy needs and its potential to fulfil national security 
requirements.98 
Clear symptoms of this pragmatic reorientation of Brazil's foreign policy 
were soon made explicit by da Cunha who also affirmed that this policy would 
seek to widen the market for Brazilian exports while relying on a close 
friendship with the United States. During these years, the belief in the existence 
of shared interests made relations with the superpower, and expectations of 
mutually advantageous cooperation, unquestionable. In contrast with Argentina, 
this position finally tilted the balance in favour of a nuclear energy policy to be 
conducted under the umbrella of a special relationship with the United States. 
Yet, as would be the case in many other areas, the nuclear issue gradually 
disclosed the real limits of the belief in 'shared interests'. During these years 
Brazil continued to cooperate with the United States and therefore maintained 
its interest in regional non-proliferation, but in such a way as to leave room for 
future non-negotiable interests to be expressed.99 
The Mexican initiative was followed with interest in Washington where it 
was viewed as an expression of shared interests between the two governments 
regarding nuclear proliferation. After the 1964 Chinese nuclear test the US 
government increasingly acknowledged the need for 'intensified international 
action to strengthen the climate of political opinion' against the further spread 
of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it seemed aware of the positive impact with 
regard to the renunciation of nuclear power status of the Latin American 
proposal on the non-aligned movement.100 
Even though the US government had not yet convinced the Soviet Union that 
a Multilateral Force in Europe would in fact lessen the danger of additional 
national nuclear forces being developed, it realised that progress with the Latin 
American NFZ initiative could give new impetus to efforts to achieve an 
international non-proliferation agreement.101 This led the Johnson 
administration to press the Latin American states so that the initial results of 
negotiations aimed at establishing a NFZ could be announced at the 
forthcoming UNGA.102 This appeared particularly urgent in the light of 
changes in the Soviet leadership following Khrushchev's ouster in October 
1964. Putting the Latin American proposal before the General Assembly 
offered a useful opportunity to assess the interest in arms control of the new 
Soviet leadership.103 
Despite Brazilian insistence upon the need to postpone negotiations for a 
multilateral treaty until 'favourable conditions' had emerged the Mexican 
government stuck to holding the conference so that its results could be 
announced at that General Assembly. The preliminary meeting for Latin 
American denuclearisation was held in Mexico City in November 1964 with the 
participation of 15 delegations. The nominations of Garcia Robles, the Mexican 
subsecretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Brazilian representative Sette Camara, 
as President and Vice-President, were based on their experience and 
participation in the ENDC. As the process of negotiations would reveal the 
holders of each post embodied the two opposing and competing views that 
dominated this process. To the Mexicans, compromising national sovereignty 
on nuclear issues was the essential condition to successful negotiations, while 
the Brazilians were clearly reluctant to accept unconditional limits on nuclear 
energy development. The first signs of disagreement were evident in the 
contrast between Mexico's determination to focus on concrete issues, such as 
geographical limits and methods of verification and inspection, with the 
Brazilian insistence on the lack of power of the preliminary meeting to adopt 
any concrete resolutions. 
There is little doubt that the 1964 Chinese nuclear explosion had a significant 
impact on both the Brazilian and Argentine view of the agreement. 
Nevertheless, at a time when international estimates of nuclear proliferation 
were alarming, China's detonation also provided new impetus to the goal of 
non-proliferation and raised expectations about the superpowers' interest and 
commitment to NFZs. 
The ambivalent character of the Argentine and Brazilian postures reflected 
increasing consideration being given to the nuclear status, while their apparent 
support for the goal of regional denuclearisation offered hints of what would 
become a clearly ambiguous policy towards non-proliferation. This attitude 
resembled the subsequent characteristic ambiguity pursued by potential nuclear 
powers after the 1974 Indian explosion. The core of this ambiguity rested on 
the combination of the steady development of nuclear programmes with 
reassurances about their peaceful character and the avoidance of full 
commitment to non-proliferation regimes. 
The interest expressed by the Netherlands in participating in the negotiations 
raised the question of the role to be played by states with territorial 
responsibilities within the region - France, Britain, the United States and the 
Netherlands - and of the implications of the negotiations for the status of those 
territories and ultimately for decolonisation. Discussions concerning 
geographical definitions were influenced by the process of decolonisation 
taking place in those years. In the case of France it soon became clear that its 
assertiveness as a nuclear power would have a significant impact upon French 
decolonisation in the region. France was offering associated states a place in its 
union while maintaining full responsibility for their foreign affairs and defence. 
The first stages of the negotiations led to the setting up of a permanent 
Preparatory Commission for Latin American Denuclearisation (COPREDAL). 
The creation of this commission, devoted to the writing of a first draft treaty, 
together with the establishment of three specialised groups with defined 
responsibilities, reflected awareness of the need for an institutional structure to 
negotiate the commitments of nuclear powers and powers with de jure or de 
facto control over territories within the region, on the one hand, and to deal 
with the difficult question of 'peaceful uses' of nuclear energy. 
The sessions of COPREDAL took place between 1965 and 1967 when the 
treaty was opened to signature.104 At this stage Cuban participation seemed 
beyond any real possibility. After the chilly reception given to a third offer, 
Castro seemed convinced that, regardless of changes in US administrations, the 
normalisation of relations with the United States was not a realistic goal. 
Moreover, American escalation in Vietnam since the summer of 1964, the 
Cuban leader's increasing isolation in Latin America after Goulart's fall and 
Allende's defeat in the Chilean presidential elections, as well as the 
implications of the Sino-Soviet split upon Cuba's defence, increased Castro's 
feelings of insecurity. This time his response was not a peace proposal but the 
adoption of a confrontational and revolutionary posture in both domestic and 
foreign affairs.105 This move back to confrontation was a difficult and risky 
attempt to maintain a margin of independence between the two superpowers 
through the simultaneous pursuit of international prestige and bargaining power. 
This strategy reflected Castro's disappointment at having failed to obtain the 
ultimate Soviet security guarantee and his anxiety in the face of the clear limits 
imposed by his Soviet alignment on finding alternative means of security. 
Underlying the rhetoric of Cuban criticisms or its endorsement of Soviet 
policies lay 'a reminder of Soviet responsibilities for Cuban defence'.106 
Although the Mexican delegation avoided a definite answer to questions 
related to the prospects of Cuban participation, it was already clear that Cuban 
participation had no chance once all Latin American states, excepting Mexico, 
had complied with the OAS vote to break diplomatic relations with Castro's 
regime.107 Moreover it seems reasonable to suggest that, in the light of 
Castro's confrontational posture, the issue of Cuban participation was out of the 
question for the time being.108 
The lack of clear geographical delimitation and of a geographical concept of 
'Latin America' was acknowledged during this first period of sessions of 
COPREDAL. However, the incorporation of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
was agreed. An initiative for inspections to be carried out by unbiased 
international authorities, such as the director of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) was also endorsed. It was agreed that diplomatic negotiations 
with foreign powers responsible for territories within the area, including 
disputed territories, should not affect their political status, nor could they be 
interpreted as negatively affecting related Latin American interests. 
The second period of sessions of COPREDAL, which took place during the 
summer of 1965, was mainly devoted to the discussion of a first draft. This 
draft, which had been prepared under the supervision of William Epstein, 
Director of the UN Secretariat's Disarmament Affairs Division, included 
fourteen preliminary articles mainly dealing with verification, inspection and 
control details. A declaration of principles accompanied the draft which not 
only acknowledged the sine qua non of non-proliferation commitment, the 
acceptance of limitations on national sovereignty in exchange for international 
peace and security, but also addressed Latin American concerns with economic 
and social development at a time when hopes were still placed on the Alliance 
for Progress. 
By this time the number of parties to the conference had grown considerably 
and included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. The significant increase in the number of observers - including 
Canada, Denmark, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, 
Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden and Yugoslavia - provided well-grounded 
evidence of the support that efforts aimed at non-proliferation would elicit.109 
The reluctance shown by France to cooperate was taken into account, but it 
remained overshadowed by the critical question of Cuban participation. Earlier, 
in 1965, in a speech characteristic of his confrontational rhetoric, Castro 
recalled that Cuba 'did not vacillate . . . in order to strengthen the socialist 
camp . . . and defend the Revolution in risking the dangers of nuclear war . . 
. on our soil when we agreed to the installation of strategic thermonuclear 
missiles on our territory'. It is not difficult to imagine the explosive effect that 
his concluding remarks had on Latin American audiences when he stated 'not 
only did we agree to their installation, but we did not agree to their 
removal'.110 
The official US position was finally disclosed, offering support to those 
NFZs which included all the 'important' regional states, did not have 
detrimental effects on regional security arrangements and provided effective 
means for verification. It explicitly recognised the contribution of NFZs to 
nuclear non-proliferation policies. The Gilpatric Report on nuclear proliferation 
had already acknowledged the potential of NFZs to halt nuclear proliferation 
and the crucial role of the nuclear powers' guarantees in ensuring their 
viability. The main policy guidelines established by this report were to reduce 
US reliance on nuclear weapons in order to downplay their political importance, 
and to involve China in disarmament negotiations.111 
Further conversations on the question of Cuban participation in the Latin 
American NFZ took place between US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the 
Mexican Foreign Minister, Carrillo Flores, in October 1965. During this 
meeting Carrillo Flores told Rusk that his government continued in its efforts 
to persuade Castro to join the agreement. Rusk informed the Mexican diplomat 
that in previous and more recent conversations with the Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Gromyko had made clear that the Soviet Union had nothing to do 
with Cuba's position and had even recalled its failure to persuade Castro to join 
the PTBT. During these conversations the positions of Argentina and Brazil vis-
a-vis the agreement were also addressed and characterised by the Mexican 
Foreign Minister as 'unfriendly'.112 
The US position regarding COPREDAL's deliberations was made public 
when Rusk declared that the United States had not only been following Latin 
American efforts with deep interest and sympathy but greatly valued their 
consistency with the 'best hemispheric traditions', adding that his government 
would 'see with satisfaction' the success of these efforts. He made clear the 
difficulty for the United States of denuclearising Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands, but announced a decision to include the Guantanamo base and the zone 
of the Panama Canal on the understanding that 'it should not affect in any way 
international transit rights'.113 The negotiation of a new treaty with Panama 
had been resolved through bilateral talks between the two governments. The 
envisaged treaty would grant the United States the 'necessary rights for the 
operation and defence of the canal' and would also recognise Panama's 
'sovereignty over the waterway'.114 
In that same year the British government announced the presence of a 
representative at future meetings of the Preparatory Commission. This decision, 
together with the more active role played by the British government regarding 
non-proliferation, was probably influenced by the Chinese explosion of the 
previous year and its particular impact on India. During a conference of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers the British representative had submitted a draft 
declaration of intent on non-proliferation.115 The British position made clear 
its readiness to discuss with the governments and authorities of dependent 
territories their inclusion within such a scheme. Yet, as had been the case with 
the French government, the British government withheld a formal position. 
The Soviet position reaffirmed its commitment to NFZs as long as they were 
also supported by other nuclear powers.116 On this occasion, no mention was 
made of Soviet commitment to the defence of Cuba. Yet by now differences 
with Cuba over this particular issue and more general Third World causes were 
clear. Contrasting with Cuba's isolation in Latin America, the Soviet Union 
began to expand its economic links and diplomatic contacts throughout the 
region. The Soviet Union seemed to be finding its place as a responsible 
superpower committed to the norms of detente. After Khrushchev's fall in 
October 1964 the new Soviet leadership appeared to be ready to take a 
pragmatic and cautious approach. The pursuit of this pragmatic policy was 
particularly clear on the issue of ideological commitments, the role of 
communist parties in peaceful change, and equally important, in the field of 
arms control.117 
Previous Brazilian opposition to proposed drafts led to the consideration of 
a third treaty draft in April 1966. By this time deep differences dividing the 
parties into two opposing factions became clear. The position led by Brazil, 
rather than seeing the difficult questions of Cuban participation, peaceful 
nuclear explosions (PNEs), and nuclear powers' guarantees as long term 
problems, used them as a shield to defend particular interests. Underlying 
Brazilian rhetoric lay the determination to avoid a 'rigorous treaty'. In contrast, 
the view represented by the Mexican delegation, aware of the complexity of 
these questions, was to be prepared to face them and most importantly to 
compromise national sovereignty in order to take the first step in the direction 
of the treaty's conclusion. 
To Brazil the commitment of nuclear powers and Cuban participation had to 
precede the formulation of any treaty, and on this basis, its delegate simply 
rejected the second treaty draft. It soon became clear that Brazil would not 
openly oppose Latin American diplomatic efforts but would insist on detailed 
requirements in an effort to delay, if not obstruct the course of negotiations. 
Moreover, comments made on particular articles hinted at Brazil's 
determination to keep its freedom of action on nuclear energy matters. These 
included proposals to eliminate the need for previous authorisation of PNEs 
stipulated by article 13, and to make substantial changes to article 22 endowing 
it with universality and reciprocity.118 
At the time the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Itamaraty, had just 
started a special course on nuclear energy indicating its future role in the 
formulation of nuclear energy policy. By mobilising efforts it would create a 
dynamic infrastucture, ready to absorb nuclear technology and to coordinate 
agreements with the leading countries in nuclear technology. The ultimate goal 
was to accelerate Brazilian nuclear energy development, as expressed by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Juracy Magalhaes, the ultimate goal was the 
achievement of 'Brazil 's rapid nuclearisation, access to nuclear energy 
resources and the wide spectrum of peaceful application of nuclear 
phenomena'.119 
The success of the Brazilian delegation in moving a third, 'Brazilian', treaty 
draft was obviously closer to Argentina's position, whose delegation had kept 
a relatively low profile during the negotiations. Even though no critical 
decisions had been taken by Argentina in nuclear energy policy, its position 
revealed anxiety over any commitment that could set limits to its independent 
stance on nuclear energy. Also influencing Argentina's position was the 
potential implications of the agreement for its long term claim over the 
Falklands/Malvinas Islands. This became clear both with the geographical 
definition put forward by the Argentine delegation and the adoption of a similar 
ban to the one adopted by the Inter-American Conference on the admission of 
'political entities' subject to territorial dispute. This motion was supported by 
the Venezuelan, Guatemalan, Brazilian and Uruguayan delegations.120 With 
regard to nuclear tests Argentina insisted that as long as tests were conducted 
underground, the manufacture of nuclear weapons could be achieved whithout 
violating the PTBT.121 
The main issues discussed during the last stages of negotiations were 
ratifications, the obligations of nuclear powers, the relationship of the 
agreement to the OAS, and the transport of nuclear weapons. These issues soon 
led to further disagreements. Firstly there was lack of agreement as to the total 
number of ratifications required to make the treaty fully binding and to initiate 
surveillance activities. Although Argentina and Brazil insisted on previous 
signature and ratification the Chilean attitude offered a middle course which 
acknowledged the obstructing effects of the Brazilian motion as well as the 
insufficiency of the minimum of five parties suggested by the Commission. The 
second source of conflict was caused by the nature of the guarantees to be 
offered by the nuclear powers. While the Mexican delegation considered such 
guarantees merely an 'extremely advisable condition', Brazil firmly insisted 
that they were the non-negotiable requirement for the treaty to be made legally 
binding and to prevent the unfair distribution of privileges and obligations. 
At the time, the superpowers' support was realistically envisaged. Yet it was 
also clear that Soviet commitment remained tied to Cuban participation for the 
time being. Similarly, even though the French government had notified the 
Commission that it had 'no intentions to carry out nuclear experiments within 
the territories of its American departments and that activities taking place in the 
space centre in Guyana were only the launching of satellites', it again referred 
to constitutional constraints barring it from formal commitment to the 
agreement.122 Finally, the British government's reply announced its 
willingness to respect the treaty and its decision not to permit any inspection 
of ships or aircraft within the zone.123 
On balance the various responses given by nuclear and external powers 
offered hints of the wide and genuine sympathy generated by the Latin 
American initiative. Yet they also made clear that a number of obstacles had 
to be overcome before fully reliable commitments could be achieved. Taking 
this view, the 'optimistic' position headed by the Mexican delegation insisted 
on the need for patience and continued efforts to turn that sympathy into legally 
binding commitments. 
A third source of difference arose from the implications of the US decision 
to exclude Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and transit through the Panama 
Canal.124 Although the US government had showed some flexibility 
concerning the zone of the Panama Canal and Guantanamo, this was followed 
by categorical statements concerning the transit question. US official comments 
systematically reiterated that it assumed 'that the proposed treaty would impose 
no prohibition that would restrict the freedom of transit as based on our 
national security needs and the vital security interests of the Western 
Hemisphere, and we do not believe that a NFZ needs to, or should, compromise 
this freedom'.125 
The United States showed a clear interest in the creation of an institutional 
framework to regulate the relations between the OAS and the treaty.126 This 
move was part of a wider American attempt to revitalise the regional 
organisation through the creation of a permanent inter-American peace force. 
Yet in the aftermath of the Dominican intervention a Latin American consensus 
firmly opposed to these plans emerged.127 Instead, the inclusion was 
approved, within the text of the treaty, of an article explicitly referring to its 
compatibility with the rights and obligations emanating from the OAS and the 
Rio Treaty.128 
Perhaps the most important issue addressed during COPREDAL's third 
period of negotiations was the question of the transport of nuclear weapons 
within the proposed nuclear-free zone, including transit through the Panama 
Canal. William Epstein, the UN technical adviser, while stating that in principle 
it was possible to prohibit transit of nuclear weapons, expressed serious doubts 
as to the prospects for effective regulation. In his view transport within the 
territories of the states party to the treaty was already banned by article 1 of the 
draft treaty, while effective control, particularly over aerial and submarine 
transit, would be impossible to achieve. In any case, the treaty could be 
seriously weakened by the inclusion of unrealistic clauses. Since the spirit of 
the treaty was to avoid the 'permanent' presence of nuclear weapons and their 
introduction by 'third parties', their temporary presence could be effectively 
dealt with by the sovereign decision of each state.129 
Despite all the differences, by the end of these sessions progress in the 
formulation of the agreement was clearly perceived. The fourth and last period 
of sessions was preceded by statements reiterating US support. The future 
agreement was received by Washington as a 'deep vote of confidence in the 
Inter-American defence system' since only the United States was in a position 
'to offer collectively the nuclear defence that Latin American states would 
abjure individually'. In this way, US responsibility for the defence of the 
hemisphere 'would be eased'.130 
In relation to Cuban participation, the Mexican view affirmed that it could 
best be achieved by a 'front of moral pressure' embodied in a fully enforced 
treaty. Nevertheless the Cuban position remained unchanged.131 In a letter to 
Garcia Robles Castro reaffirmed the impossibility of Cuban participation as 
long as the 'illegal US hold over Guantanamo continued' and until the United 
States had 'withdrawn its military bases and nuclear weapons' from Puerto 
Rico, the Virgin Islands and the Panama Canal.132 
Acknowledging the efforts of Latin American states and their contribution 
to nuclear non-proliferation and to hemispheric security, both US and British 
opinions insisted on the technical impossibility of distinguishing peaceful from 
non-peaceful nuclear explosions. In their view any state with access to nuclear 
explosions and some form of means of delivery could immediately attain a 
military nuclear capability.133 While British comments simply expressed 
'doubts and concern' as to the utility of such distinctions, the United States 
explicitly stated that a number of articles 'should be modified' in order to 
prohibit all nuclear explosions.134 The Anglo-American view tilted the 
balance of the two competing interpretations in favour of the one propounded 
by Mexico. 
Behind the US position lay the awareness that only by accepting the eventual 
distinction between peaceful and military nuclear explosions, dependent upon 
technological developments, would Brazil and Argentina come to accept a 
treaty - and that 'this graceful way out' was in fact the result of the Latin 
American imperative to accommodate to their demands if a final text was to be 
achieved.135 In dealing with this problem the US government tried to 
reinforce its own view by seeking assurances from the Mexicans 'that they 
would support our interpretation of the treaty' both at COPREDAL and the 
ENDC.136 
Underlying US criticisms lay a clear, though not often public, satisfaction. 
Explicit recognition was mainly manifested in relation to COPREDAL's 
decision to adopt IAEA safeguards.137 Yet US satisfaction went beyond these 
formal statements: in a report from the US embassy in Mexico to the 
Department of State, Freeman acknowledged that the 'views of the U.S. 
regarding every aspect of this treaty have not only been explained in the most 
careful detail but have been listened to sympathetically. A significant number 
of our points are reflected in the treaty; and what has emerged represents the 
best possible compromise we could have expected'.138 
The Soviet reply reaffirmed its traditional policy towards NFZs, though it 
reserved further comments and formal commitments until the treaty had been 
formulated and the attitude of other nuclear powers made explicit.139 In 
relation to the question of PNEs, the Soviet Union carefully expressed a view 
similar to the Anglo-US attitude, by affirming that such a distinction could 
enormously complicate the solution of the non-proliferation problem.140 
The difficult issue of the transport of nuclear weapons was finally addressed 
during the last period of sessions in February 1967. Despite Argentina's 
reiteration of the need for the total prohibition of both transit and transport of 
nuclear weapons a 'softer' line was adopted. Given the lack of references, 
throughout COPREDAL's sessions, to the contemporary debate over nuclear 
deterrence, the adoption of a compromise seemed to mark the recognition of the 
complexity of that issue and of the limited prospects for effective regulation. 
The compromise that was adopted was based on the following argument. If 
the transporter was one of the parties, then transportation had already been 
included in the general prohibitions stipulated by article 1. But if the transporter 
was a non-party state, the action would not be transport but transit. Since the 
treaty made no reference to transit of nuclear weapons, the principles and law 
of international law should apply.141 This interpretation granted the territorial 
state the sovereign right to permit or deny such transit. It is clear how this 
complicated legal argument represented an euphemistic acceptance of the 
possibility of 'transit-transport' of nuclear weapons within the zone covered by 
the agreement. 
On the question of viable distinctions between peaceful and military nuclear 
explosions William Epstein shared the British and US view and suggested three 
prospective alternatives: to prohibit all PNEs, to accept the current monopoly 
held by the nuclear powers, or to implement some form of international service 
or surveillance. 
The Argentine delegate reacted strongly, stating that the only way in which 
a nuclear device could become a nuclear weapon was through the definition of 
its military utility. Therefore intention should be the core concept in the 
definition of 'nuclear weapon'.142 Following this line of interpretation the 
Brazilian representative, Correa da Costa, affirmed that the proposed treaty 
should not obstruct the future development of Latin American peoples, a 
development that in his view was intimately linked to the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy. By referring to the difficult and in many cases 'questionable' 
distinction between 'defensive' and 'offensive' weapons, he admitted that even 
those states who had developed 'demolition mines' would not necessarily be 
following a military route but could be manifesting a defensive posture. Correa 
da Costa then affirmed that PNEs could be of significant value in Latin 
America in the construction of canals, dams, and so forth. By drawing an 
analogy between other technological developments with potential military uses 
such as radio and industrial production techniques he criticised the argument 
that confused the explosion with the actual weapon as obstructing Latin 
American development. 
The Mexican position was the closest to the Anglo-US one. C. Graef stated 
that the Mexican goal was the prevention of regional nuclear proliferation while 
ensuring free access to technical and scientific development. He acknowledged 
the conflict between these two goals and the consequent need to reach a 
compromise. The Mexicans clearly gave priority to non-proliferation, as 
expressed in the proposal to accept some form of international control or 
international service for PNEs.143 With respect to the geographical definition 
of the zone, it was finally agreed that it be based on the Panama declaration of 
1939 and on article 4 of the Rio Treaty.144 Similarly, the enforcement of the 
agreement reflected the system used within the OAS and the Rio Treaty, in 
which full enforcement of the treaty had taken place when two thirds of the 
parties had signed and ratified the agreements. 
COPREDAL's fourth period of sessions ended with the adoption of three 
resolutions: to open the treaty to signature immediately and to take the final 
version of the treaty to the UNGA, the ENDC and to the General Director of 
the IAEA. 
As has become apparent the negotiating process not only took place within 
a changing international and regional context, but reflected their interplay as 
well as the concern of the parties with the treaty's potential implications for 
nuclear energy development. The Chinese nuclear detonation reinforced both 
the superpowers' concern over further nuclear proliferation and perceptions of 
the international prestige to be derived from a nuclear status. Latin Americ
was no exception to these trends. Brazilian and Argentine participation had 
offered hints of strong interest in nuclear power. Yet as the Missile Crisis made 
clear, there was also a regional consensus which acknowledged the desirability 
of nuclear non-proliferation. 
Around the question of Cuban participation converged the need to develop 
strategies to deal with the 'Cuban problem' and the dilemma equally faced by 
both superpowers between their support for non-proliferation and commitments 
to their allies. After Castro's attempts to negotiate a modus vivendi with the 
United States had failed, it became clear that Cuban incorporation into the 
denuclearisation process would remain as a long term problem. 
In addition, the negotiating process revealed the potential link between 
decolonisation and the definition of a Latin American NFZ. After the 
independence of Trinidad and Tobago in 1962 it became clear that other 
colonies and associated states could follow suit. This situation helps to explain 
the extent of the compromise that particularly Britain, France and the United 
States, were prepared to make. Both the British and US positions clearly 
rejected the idea of a UNGA resolution embodying the nuclear powers' 
commitment. In their view such resolutions not only lacked legal force, but 
above all could set a legal precedent in this direction within the General 
Assembly. Both Britain and the United States suggested instead the 
incorporation of additional protocols. 
Throughout the negotiating process, the emergence of two diverging views 
on denuclearisation became clear, the 'rigorous' view supported by the Mexican 
delegation and closer to US interests regarding non-proliferation, and the one 
shared by both Argentina and Brazil deriving from the incorporation of nuclear 
energy issues in their respective national security agendas. The critical role 
played by the military in both countries helps to explain the increasing 
perception of nuclear issues as vital for their national security. Yet, as would 
later become clear, active participation in COPREDAL's rounds enabled both 
countries to begin the pursuit of an ambiguous posture towards non-
proliferation commitments. In contrast, the Mexican case reflected geopolitical 
conditions which limited the potential role to be played by the military, but 
which also foreclosed any rational option beyond the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. The numerous problems of a procedural character arising throughout 
the negotiation of the treaty were in fact expressions of a deeper disagreement. 
Nevertheless, with options narrowing, it was gradually recognised that only 
with compromise could a final treaty be achieved. One can even maintain that 
the transport formula and the final, though ambiguous, acceptance of PNEs 
within the body of the treaty represented a compromise between the US 
position and that of the Latin American countries reluctant to constrain their 
nuclear future. The Mexican delegation, sharing the American position, came 
to accept this compromise as a second best. The rationale behind this posture 
seems to be that although the right of PNEs would be in principle recognised, 
pressure would systematicaly be exerted through continued reiteration of their 
unfeasibility. In the meantime nuclear proliferation would be prevented through 
an effective system of control and verification. Finally, despite Argentine and 
Brazilian ambiguity, it was probably expected that as soon as they became 
parties to the agreement, international pressure on their respective nuclear 
programmes would increase considerably. Even after acknowledging the main 
weaknesses of the agreement, one could therefore conclude that the treaty 
adopted in 1967 strengthened the position of those favouring non-proliferation 
throughout the region, and most importantly, that it significantly raised the 
costs of violating what was becoming a norm. 
The implementation of the Latin American 
Nuclear-Free Zone 
The Treaty of Tlatelolco was a unique international instrument not only because 
it established the first nuclear-free zone over an area embracing a group of 
states but also because it constituted the first agreement which embodied a 
legally binding restriction on the use of nuclear weapons. The agreement led 
also to the creation of one of the first agencies for Latin American collective 
action. Such action was facilitated by the uniqueness of Latin America as a 
group of independent states sharing a common history and culture. And it was 
precisely this characteristic that made Latin America particularly suitable for 
the establishment of a NFZ. 
The relative absence of interstate rivalries and conflicts has traditionally 
favoured inter-state cooperation such as that leading to the agreement of the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco. Other examples of this cooperation have been present in 
subsequent efforts aimed at controlling conventional arms within the region and 
in regional efforts for peaceful settlement of disputes such as Contadora.145 
The success of the Latin American negotiating process leading to the 
Tlatelolco Treaty could be partly attributed to these favourable conditions 
which contrast with other areas were similar initiatives have failed. But there 
is little doubt about the weight of the tacit or explicit support of both 
superpowers in the success of negotiations. 
The Treaty of Tlatelolco: analysis 
The body of the treaty comprises a preface, 32 articles and two additional 
protocols. Its preface refers to the General Assembly Resolutions leading to the 
negotiation of an agreement: GAR 1911 (XVIII) on Latin American military 
denuclearisation, and GAR 2028 (XX) which emphasised the need for fair 
distribution of responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear 
states as an essential principle of any arms control agreement. This principle 
was embodied in Protocol II of the treaty. 
Article 1 of the treaty describes the basic obligations of the parties, designed 
to ensure the total prohibition of nuclear weapons within the region. Despite all 
its weaknesses Tlatelolco offers a wider scope and stricter regime for the 
prohibition of nuclear weapons than are to be found in other multilateral arms 
control agreements. This is the case in relation to the Antarctic Treaty, whose 
article 5 only prohibits nuclear testing and the dumping of radioactive waste, 
to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, whose constraints do not apply to 
intercontinental missiles and satellites, to the Sea-Bed Treaty which excludes 
regulation of uses of the ocean above the sea bed, and to the Partial Test Ban 
Treaty, whose coverage was partial. Both Tlatelolco and the later Non-
Proliferation Treaty ensure that the number of nuclear states, that is states with 
sovereign control over nuclear weapons, does not increase - but the NPT's 
Achilles heel lies in its failure to restrict nuclear weapons deployment in other 
states' territory. 
The definition of concepts as used in the treaty is embodied in article 2, 
which also defines the parties to the treaty. Article 3 defines the territory of the 
parties to include the territorial sea, the air space and other areas under their 
sovereignty. Finally, the concept of 'nuclear weapon' is defined in article 5 as 
any device capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and 
which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike 
purposes. 
A group of nine articles is devoted to the setting up of a permanent 
international organisation and to its responsibilities in the implementation and 
enforcement of the agreement. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) based in Mexico City, started working 
in 1969 on setting up a system of control and verification.146 
The Treaty of Tlatelolco creates a system of control which is particularly 
comprehensive and potentially effective in comparison with other international 
instruments of a similar nature, including those of the NPT. These 
characteristics are the result of a dual system of control provided by: 1) 
OPANAL's regime of verification, which consists of the parties' reports 
(Art. 14), special reports requested by the General Secretary (Art. 15) and special 
inspections (Art. 16); and 2) the IAEA system of safeguards as established in 
article 13 which was later replaced by the standard agreement applied to NPT 
signatories.147 Article 12 defines the scope for verification which includes 
inspection of devices, services and facilities intended for peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy, so as to ensure that none of the activities prohibited in article 
1 are carried out.148 Articles 16 and 20 provide a number of mechanisms to 
prevent violations of the agreement. 
The ambiguity surrounding the treatment of peaceful nuclear explosions 
represented, until quite recently, one of the main weaknesses of the Tlatelolco 
Treaty - even though it can be argued that the main advantage of the NPT as 
compared to Tlatelolco is that its article II prohibits the manufacture or 
acquisition of nuclear weapons or any other 'nuclear explosive devices'. As the 
process of negotiation made clear, the apparent permission to conduct PNEs, 
embodied in article 18, allowed disagreement between conflicting 
interpretations. An 'orthodox' interpretation, led by Garcia Robles, insisted on 
the need to observe article 5's definition of 'nuclear weapon', and the resulting 
incompatibility of PNEs with the spirit of the treaty.149 A second 
interpretation, based on article 17 and paragraph one of article 18, claimed that 
the treaty sanctioned PNEs even if they involved devices 'similar to those used 
in nuclear weapons'.150 This 'ambiguity' or 'compromise' served as a 
precedent to article V of the NPT which calls for a non-discriminatory 
availability of all the potential benefits of PNEs. 
The negotiations also made clear the lack of consensus regarding the entry 
into force of the agreement. The solution agreed and embodied in article 28 has 
been described as a sui generis formula allowing for two different alternatives. 
The 'conditional' alternative states that the treaty shall enter into force among 
the states that have ratified it as soon as an important number of requirements 
had been met, while a 'general rule', stipulated that the treaty shall enter into 
force upon deposit of the instrument of ratification of the treaty accompanied 
by a waiver of these requirements. Paragraph 4 of article 28 also foresees the 
emergence of new nuclear powers by stating that the rise of a new power 
possessing nuclear weapons shall have the effect of suspending the 
implementation of the treaty for parties who have ratified it but failed to waive 
the requirements, or for those who may request it, until the new nuclear power 
has ratified Protocol II. Finally, this article led to two different interpretations 
of the zone of application of the agreement: a 'mobile' zone and a 'permanent' 
one. The notion of mobility refers to the expansion of the zone as the result of 
new adhesions, while the latter refers to the fulfilment of all the requirements 
of article 28. This definition represents another controversial point of the 
agreement since it embraces the territory, territorial sea, airspace and any other 
space under the sovereignty of zonal states. The controversy basically arises 
from the extension of the NFZ over hundreds of kilometres from the coasts of 
signatory states.151 
Until recently, article 25, which deals with the process of signature, included 
an unfortunate exception which obstructed Guyana's incorporation, by 
depriving the General Conference of the right to admit any political entity part 
or all of whose territory is (prior to the date of the opening of the treaty for 
signature) the subject of a dispute or claim between an extra-continental 
country and one or more Latin American states.152 Thanks to recent changes 
in the OAS charter, OPANAL finally decided to remove the clause which 
impeded Guyana's adherence. 
Although article 27 stipulates that the treaty shall not be subject to 
reservations, COPREDAL tacitly accepted interpretative declarations which had 
arisen in relation to PNEs (in the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Nicaragua), 
disputed territories, the question of transit and the definition of the zone of 
application. Interpretative declarations have also accompanied adherence to 
both protocols. 
The duration of the treaty and withdrawal of the parties are dealt with by 
article 30. It specifies that the treaty shall be of a permanent nature and shall 
remain in force indefinitely. A party could withdraw 'under circumstances that 
affect its supreme interests or the peace or security of one or more contracting 
parties', though any withdrawal should be notified in advance so that it could 
be automatically reported to all parties, as well as to the UN General Secretary. 
The Treaty of Tlatelolco: additional protocols 
The preamble to both protocols emphasises the importance of the treaty as a 
step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the need to 
consider non-proliferation as a stage in the achievement both of 'general and 
complete disarmament' and of a 'world at peace based on mutual respect and 
sovereign equality of states'. It was agreed that both protocols would enter into 
force on the date of deposit of the respective instruments of ratification and that 
they would also have an indefinite duration. 
Protocol I binds territories under de jure or de facto extra-continental 
responsibility to the denuclearisation statute (as defined by articles 1, 3, 5, and 
13), though it does not impose upon its parties any of the obligations contained 
in articles 14, 15 and 16. It was agreed that since the rights of its parties would 
not be as extensive as those of the parties to the treaty, their obligations should 
equally be less stringent. In relation to the system of control the parties are only 
obliged to agree bilateral agreements with the IAEA. 
Protocol II requests the nuclear powers to respect the denuclearised status of 
Latin America and not to contribute in any way to activities against article 1 's 
obligations, and equally important, not to use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against the contracting parties. This protocol embodies the principle 
of balanced responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear 
states. 
By October 1967 the treaty had already been signed by all the Latin 
American states party to the Preliminary Commission. Tlatelolco represents the 
first multilateral treaty in the field of nuclear arms control which includes an 
integrated system of control. Another important contribution of Tlatelolco lies 
in its emphasis on the need for an acceptable balanced distribution of 
responsibilities and mutual obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear states. 
Main challenges to the implementation of the 
Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone 
Signature and ratification 
Eight years after the treaty had been opened for signature it had come into force 
for 17 of the 22 parties for whom it was open to signature. This meant that 
those 17 states had not only signed and ratified it, but had waived the 
conditions attached to article 28 so that the treaty had entered into force for 
them all. Two states, Cuba and Guyana, had not signed the agreement. Neither 
Brazil nor Chile had waived the requirements attached to article 28, while 
Argentina had repeatedly failed to ratify the agreement. 
An evaluation of the implementation of the agreement in 1975 could 
therefore conclude that the balance-sheet was positive. Progress was above all 
perceived in the adherence of both China and France to Protocol II. This was 
a significant achievement given their opposition, at the time, to the NPT and the 
PTBT. From this perspective the problem posed by the achievement of two 
ratifications, two waivers of article 28 and the incorporation of Cuba and 
Guyana still seemed susceptible of being gradually solved. Guyana's inclusion 
became more likely by the beginning of the 1990s as the result of modifications 
to article 25, similar to earlier changes in the OAS charter, which have removed 
previous obstacles to Guyana's participation in both organisations. 
Having the United States, Great Britain, China and France as parties to 
Protocol II increased the likelihood of Soviet participation. This appeared 
particularly feasible given the fact that Soviet isolation continued to contradict 
its traditional support for NFZs. Its isolation as the only nuclear power not 
party to the guarantee certainly increased the pressures on it to join Protocol II. 
Finally, it is important to underline the recent decision taken by the French 
government finally to ratify Protocol I of the Tlatelolco Treaty.153 Not only 
would the French ratification complete the overall process of signature and 
ratification of both protocols, but it would also place the islands of Guadalupe 
and Martinique and French Guyana under the provisions provided by the 
Tlatelolco Treaty. 
Cuban participation 
Another source of long lasting pessimism as to the prospects for further 
progress in the implementation of the regional non-proliferation regime has 
been Cuba's incorporation to Tlatelolco. For a long time Cuban participation 
remained the most critical factor in the success or failure of the treaty. Since 
the first invitation to Cuba to join the effort in 1964, the Cuban government 
continued to insist on prior US withdrawal from Guantanamo and the 
incorporation of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands into the regime of absolute 
prohibition of nuclear weapons. Given its regional isolation, Cuba's 
participation remained highly unlikely. 
The advantages of bringing Cuba within the regime again became evident 
during the early 1970s when concern about evidence that the Soviet Union was 
building a submarine base in the island was raised in the region. Yet Castro's 
confrontational policies, leading up to Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975, 
precluded any negotiations. Nevertheless this problem was partially solved by 
reassurances by the Soviet Union to the United States about its tacit 
commitment not to introduce nuclear weapons into the Western hemisphere. 
Moreover, this commitment was subsequently formalised by Soviet adherence 
to Protocol II of Tlatelolco in 1979.'54 
Although during the 1980s there were signs indicating Cuba's interest in a 
change in US-Cuban relations, among which the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola, the improvement of human rights and the decision to postpone 
TV broadcasts to Florida were the most important, meetings between senior 
officials from both governments, held in Mexico and Canada, did not produce 
tangible results. In addition the impact of the dramatic changes which have 
taken place within the USSR and Eastern Europe have placed Castro on a 
defensive position. Despite this, important changes have lately accompanied a 
significant shift in Cuban attitude towards the agreement. Not only has the 
island decided to participate as an observer in OPANAL, but Cuba has even 
affirmed that it would join the agreement once Brazil, Argentina and Chile have 
fulfilled their recent promises fully to adhere to the agreement.155 
The Falklands/Malvinas crisis 
One of the most challenging tests to the interpretation and implementation of 
the treaty was provided by the Falklands/Malvinas war of 1982. The South 
Atlantic conflict highlighted the importance of the treaty in terms of its two 
basic aspirations: that of the guarantees provided by nuclear powers and that of 
preventing regional proliferation. 
The question of the use of nuclear energy for propelling vehicles had first 
arisen in OPANAL during the late 1960s and early 1970s when the Jamaican 
delegation put forward the issue. But it was left unresolved by the conference. 
The report on Naval Weapon states came to the conclusion that given the cost 
and complexity of this use of nuclear energy, it would be confined to warships. 
Nuclear energy has been mainly used in submarines and has not only increased 
their speed but their capacity to remain submerged for longer periods of time.156 
The sinking of the Belgrano during the Falklands/Malvinas war by a nuclear 
propelled submarine again placed this difficult question at the fore-front of the 
debate. Moreover, the question was further complicated by the unclear nature 
of the provisions on transport and transit. Were nuclear propelled vessels 
prohibited or permitted by the agreement? Argentina claimed that it represented 
a non-peaceful use of nuclear energy, while Great Britain denied having 
deployed any nuclear weapon within the zone of application of the treaty, 
though it officially restated its practice of non-confirmation and non-denial.157 
But beyond the particular issue of nuclear propelled vehicles the real concern 
was the possibility of the presence of nuclear weapons in the region during the 
confrontation. This hypothesis has been based on the assumption that given the 
redeployment of the British North Atlantic and Mediterranean fleet to the South 
Atlantic, and its previous task within NATO, it was not entirely unlikely that 
nuclear weapons were being carried on board.158 Even if one could assume 
that nuclear weapons were actually introduced the relevant question is whether 
this involved a violation of the agreement. In order to answer this question we 
have to look at Protocols I and II, to which Great Britain is a party, to try to 
determine whether the conflict took place within the zone of application of the 
agreement. 
At the time of the crisis the islands were either under de facto or de jure 
British responsibility and since a British declaration accompanying ratification 
of Protocol I extended its commitment to the islands, it seems clear that the 
presence of nuclear weapons would have constituted a violation of Protocol I. 
In the case of British observation of Protocol II the situation does not look so 
clear. This lack of clarity is the result of Argentina's failure to ratify the 
agreement and the consequent exclusion of its territory from the zone of 
application of the treaty. Under this interpretation the claim of British violation 
has no ground. 
OPANAL reacted simply by expressing 'its concern' and by taking note of 
the Argentine and British claims in its resolution 170 (VIII). The muted nature 
of this reaction was the consequence of the lack of any other legal instruments 
and probably also of the indirect pressure exerted by the previous US 
declaration stating that the actions taken by the British Navy in the South 
Atlantic were not incompatible with British obligations under Protocols I and 
II.159 
Whatever the reasons behind OPANAL's attitude its performance revealed 
its incapacity to take advantage of the legal and political opportunities offered 
by the instruments provided by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Equally important, this 
event demonstrated to Argentina the implications and disadvantages of having 
failed to become a party to the agreement, particularly in relation to its right to 
participate and therefore to call an exceptional meeting of OPANAL's main 
agencies. But despite the initial hopes that the transition to civilian rule had 
awakened, the Argentine government remained reluctant to ratify the treaty. 
The more recent renunciation by Argentina and Brazil of their claim to PNEs, 
paving the way to a regional system of safeguards, could have a positive impact 
on Argentina's views about the ratification of Tlatelolco. 
The implementation of Protocols I and II 
Protocol I has been signed and ratified by all powers with territorial 
responsibilities within the region with the sole exception of France. French 
ratification would bring the islands of Guadalupe and Martinique and French 
Guyana into the zone. Traditionally France argued its incapacity to ratify this 
protocol on constitutional grounds. Yet this justification was seriously 
undermined by previous cases in which France accepted some form of 
demilitarisation. During the last decade France has maintained a more 
favourable attitude towards non-proliferation, attending for the first time the 
1990 NPT Review Conference and more recently announcing its decision to 
join the NPT and to ratify Protocol I of Tlatelolco.160 It is important to 
emphasise that France's ratification of Protocol I would bring the process of 
signature and ratification of Tlatelolco's Protocols I and II to its completion. 
Great Britain was the first party to sign and ratify Protocol I in December 
1969. It was followed by the Netherlands in 1971. Both ratifications were 
accompanied by declarations stating that any interpretation of this Protocol 
could not affect the legal status of the territories under their responsibility. US 
ratification in 1981 included the canal zone of Panama but the incorporation of 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands was made dependent upon Cuban 
participation. 
Protocol II was first signed and ratified by both the United States and the 
United Kingdom with accompanying interpretative declarations. These stated 
that the concepts of territory and sovereignty embodied in article 3 of the treaty 
should observe the general principles of International Law. It is important to 
note that by becoming a party to Protocol II the United States entered, for the 
first time, into an obligation that restricted its use of nuclear weapons. French 
adherence to the protocol (1973) took a long time and involved difficult 
negotiations.161 China's adherence became feasible once it became a UN 
member in 1971. By June 1974 China had signed and ratified the agreement 
and in this way had become for the first time a party to a nuclear arms control 
agreement. 
China had consistently supported the total prohibition of nuclear arms and 
considered commitments by the nuclear powers not to use them as a first step 
in this direction. China's adherence to Tlatelolco did not affect its previous 
criticisms of the PTBT and the NPT.162 Its opposition was based on the 
limitations that the PTBT would have imposed on its pursuit of a nuclear 
capability, while its criticism of the NPT focused on its 'discriminatory 
character' and its potential to be used by the superpowers to maintain and 
strengthen their nuclear monopoly.163 Its decision to develop nuclear weapons 
was justified in terms of defence as breaking the nuclear monopoly of both 
superpowers. The main characteristic of China's policy on nuclear weapons lies 
in its unilateral pledge not to be the first to use such weapons at any time or in 
any circumstance. 
China's adherence to Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco forms part of a 
wider and unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear weapons states or NFZs. China's signature of 
Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco was accompanied by declarations about 
the need to have all nuclear powers undertaking this commitment. In relation 
to Latin America Chinese comments argued that an effective regional non-
proliferation regime should involve the dismantling of all foreign military bases 
and the total prohibition of nuclear weapons transport.164 Finally, as 
mentioned earlier, Soviet ratification came in 1979, putting an end to its 
previous hesitant attitude. 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 
The controversial question of peaceful nuclear explosions was an object of most 
declarations which regarded them as being prohibited by articles 18, 1 and 5 
until it becomes technologically feasible to carry out PNEs. But an alternative 
view represented by Argentina claimed that the right to conduct PNEs formed 
part of the original intentions of the agreement. 
The 1974 Indian explosion and its denomination as a PNE again raised this 
delicate issue within the context of the implementation of the agreement. Was 
India a new nuclear power whose guarantee should be incorporated under 
Protocol II? The Indian explosion brought to the fore the problem of PNEs. It 
again confronted the Latin American parties with the dilemma of how to deal 
with nuclear explosions in the treaty. They could either reinforce the guarantees 
offered by Protocol II or they could maintain their policy of ambiguity in 
relation to this question. 
The problem continued to be postponed for two reasons: firstly, by India's 
systematic denial of having acquired a military nuclear capability, its insistence 
upon the 'peaceful' character of its explosion and its restraint in carrying out 
further explosions, and secondly by the absence of any request for suspension 
of the agreement from any of the Latin American parties to the treaty. India's 
behaviour also kept the question open since the definition of nuclear weapon 
as embodied in article 5 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco does not consider any 
subjective element of intention. That is to say, beyond Indian intentions the lack 
of sufficient conditions to distinguish peaceful from non-peaceful nuclear 
explosions made India a de facto nuclear power. More recently the apparent 
renunciation of PNEs by both Brazil and Argentina, and their acceptance of 
IAEA safeguards, have not only reinforced the latter interpretation, but 
highlighted the advantages of NFZs for reconciling greater flexibility with safe 
regulation. 
Brazilian and Argentine nuclear aspirations 
When Brazilian and Argentine nuclear aspirations were taken into account the 
prospects for progress seemed less promising. Domestic political events in 
Argentina and Brazil, as well as external influences, affected the course taken 
by their respective nuclear energy programmes and consequently their positions 
vis-a-vis the regional non-proliferation agreement. Delays in Argentine 
ratification and the shield provided to Brazil by article 28 were soon identified 
as the main and more difficult obstacles to the implementation of the regional 
non-proliferation regime. 
The 1966 military coup in Argentina differed from previous military 
interventions aimed at the 're-establishment of constitutional rule' and had laid 
the basis for a prolonged military rule which granted the military a considerable 
margin of manoeuvre in carrying out earlier ambitious programmes which had 
been interrupted by endemic political instability. A new definition of national 
sovereignty led the armed forces to impose limits on what they considered 
excessive liberalism in strategic sectors such as steel and nuclear energy. The 
Atucha nuclear plant project received renewed impetus while the General 
Direction of Military Manufactures decided to take from the United States the 
contract for the expansion of Villa Constitution steel mill. These decisions, 
together with limited access to arms purchases in the United States, created new 
sources of tension in the already complicated relationship with the hegemonic 
power. Technical limitations of US military aid and control over types of 
military weaponry were seen as a deliberate attempt by Washington to 
transform Latin American armies into 'colonial police forces', adequate for 
counter-insurgency but without real military power. 
These considerations were logically extended to the nuclear energy sector 
which had already been identified as a target for control on the part of the 
nuclear powers. US restrictions on transfers of sensitive technology and 
sophisticated weaponry led the Argentine military to approach Europe.165 In 
1968 the National Atomic Energy Commission (NAEC) announced its decision 
to grant Siemens, the West German Company, the contract to build the first 
nuclear power plant Atucha I. NAEC's choice of a system based on natural 
uranium rather than enriched uranium fuel as in American-designed reactors, 
enabled Argentina not only to consume its own uranium reserves, but above all 
to escape obligatory international controls. Official justification for this 
decision, which discarded American bids, was the avoidance of absolute 
dependence on the single source of enriched uranium, namely the United 
States.166 
Beyond considerations of technological and fuel dependence lay a deeper 
commitment to nuclear energy development. Just one year after the signature 
of the Tlatelolco Treaty, Argentina's position in relation to non-proliferation 
policies became clear. In the 1968 UN debate on the NPT the Argentine 
delegate stated that 'Argentina could not accept remaining subject to a 
continuing dependence on the great powers for nuclear technology for peaceful 
ends' and concluded that the NPT would 'disarm the unarmed' while imposing 
no restrictions on the arms race between the superpowers. This phrase would 
later become the norm for Argentine opposition to this treaty. 
By the early 1970s Argentina was already operating six major centres for 
nuclear research and the proportion of scientists and engineers trained in the 
United States and Europe had significantly increased. In 1973 the NAEC signed 
a contract for a second reactor, the Candu (Canadian Deuterium Uranium). The 
Argentine-Canadian agreement stipulated the peaceful application of the 
technology and imposed IAEA safeguards. During this period another ambitious 
programme was announced for the years 1975-1985 to develop large scale 
manufacturing capacity and to start the construction of a heavy water plant by 
1980. Early in 1974 Atucha I, a 9320 megawatt power plant, was being readied 
for operation. Yet behind the grandiloquent pronouncements of the Argentine 
government in the field of nuclear energy, persistent political instability 
continued to obstruct the NAEC's ambitious programme. This was particularly 
the case during the years of Isabel Peron's government (1973-1976), when 
bureaucratic obstacles, budget cuts, salary freezes and delays in decision 
making were commonplace. As a result of this there was a massive exodus of 
prominent scientists and technicians who found better opportunities in the 
Brazilian and Iranian nuclear programmes. 
By the mid 1970s the interaction between the Argentine and Brazilian 
nuclear programmes came to the surface. If one could argue that Argentina's 
nuclear programme had enjoyed a relatively clear direction since its origins, in 
the Brazilian case, international events as well as political decisions gradually 
shaped the course followed by its nuclear energy policy. Goulart's enthusiasm 
for regional denuclearisation had first been followed by a cautious withdrawal 
from a leading position after the 1964 military coup and, subsequently, by a 
more equivocal position. During the Costa e Silva government nuclear issues 
were considered part of Brazil's national interest. The increasing nationalism 
which permeated Brazilian foreign policy during these years expanded to the 
field of nuclear energy policy. 
These changes were partly the result of a new ideology developed within the 
Escola Superior de Guerra which was embodied in a particular doctrine of 
national security which gave powerful political roles to the military. National 
Security was broadly defined as encompassing all aspects of economic 
development and particularly that of nuclear energy. The new policy was made 
public in Costa e Silva's 1967 speech: 
We will thus give priority to the problem of development. The diplomatic 
actions of my government will aim, at both bilateral and multilateral 
levels, at widening our external markets, at obtaining fair and stable prices 
for our products, at attracting capital and technical assistance and, of 
particular importance, at the cooperation necessary for the peaceful 
nuclearisation of the country.167 
Even though Brazil had signed and ratified the Tlatelolco agreement, the 
Costa e Silva government, protected by the shield provided by the provisions 
of article 28 decided to pursue an independent route for the Brazilian nuclear 
programme. Evidence of this was provided by the 1967 decision to start 
working towards an independent nuclear fuel cycle. 
The nuclear field was not an exception in the gradual deterioration of US-
Brazilian relations. Gradual coolness in the relationship between the two 
countries was the result, on the one hand, of the new approach taken by 
Brazilian foreign policy - which was itself influenced by institutional and 
bureaucratic factors such as the particular identity that Itamaraty, the Brazilian 
Foreign Ministry, had developed over the years - and, on the other, of 
perceptions of the weakening of US commitment towards the southern partner. 
The deterioration of the relationship with Brazil was not the only manifestation 
of the American withdrawal from the region. Vietnam and domestic concerns 
kept the attention of both the Johnson and Nixon administrations. And, equally 
important, after a period of close cooperation, a complex pattern emerged 
linking Latin American nationalism (with an increasing feeling of US 
overcommitment) to anti-US feeling in the region, to partial US withdrawal and 
finally, to increasing frustration within Latin America. 
The conditions imposed by the United States upon transfer of nuclear 
technology began to be perceived as too stringent, and most importantly, 
risking Brazil's permanent dependence on foreign nuclear technology. This 
redefinition of nuclear energy policy was soon seen by the United States as a 
symptom of what Walt Rostow called the 'puzzling ambivalence' in Costa e 
Silva's foreign policy.168 As part of the new approach to nuclear energy 
issues the Brazilian National Security Council established independent nuclear 
capability as a permanent national objective.169 Domestic support for the new 
policy was expressed in public concern about the implications of Tlatelolco for 
'Brazil 's legitimate right to develop a nuclear programme' and for its future 
security interests. These concerns were also expressed by Itamaraty's criticism 
of the Mexican 'unconditional denuclearisation' and reaffirmation of its 
decision not to allow any restriction of nuclear development. While supporting 
non-proliferation, the Foreign Ministry would also promote foreign cooperation 
for Brazilian 'peaceful nuclearisation'.170 In that period the Brazilian 
government secretly began to work on a 15 year plan for nuclear 
independence.171 
Awareness of Argentine nuclear development may also have played a role 
in the new direction taken by the Costa e Silva government. By 1968 the 
Argentine NAEC began the operation, on a pilot scale, of the first chemical 
processing plant for 'reclaiming plutonium from spent reactor fuel ' in the 
region.172 In Brazil, the Nuclear Energy National Council was particularly 
sensitive to these moves. It had reacted strongly against the 1962 
denuclearisation proposal on the basis of forecasts about Chinese and Argentine 
nuclear aspirations. By this time, and taking into account the nuclear policies 
of both India and Israel, it actively supported Costa e Silva's efforts to resist 
diplomatic pressures aimed at bringing Brazil into the NPT. In the Council's 
opinion the crucial element was the development of autonomous sources of 
nuclear fuel.173 
Behind Costa e Silva's rhetoric and efforts towards greater autonomy, 
differences with the United States, including nuclear energy issues, remained 
manageable. The actual meaning of these differences lay mainly in their long-
term implications and their relation with Brazil's foreign policy reassessment 
of the relationship with the United States.174 Nevertheless, the United States 
continued to enjoy Brazilian support in joint opposition both to Venezuela's oil 
nationalisation and to China's admission to the UN, while anticommunism 
continued to be strongly expressed in relation to Cuba and by a low profile in 
its opposition to non-proliferation. 
Despite efforts to give the nuclear energy programme some degree of 
autonomy it remained as dependent as in the 1950s. The attempts made by 
Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto to take Brazil towards an independent 
nuclear capability conflicted with the prevailing view that development in the 
nuclear energy field could best be achieved through collaboration with the 
United States.175 The Mines and Energy Minister Jose Costa Cavalcante, 
together with important figures within the military, favoured the latter path and 
opposed confrontation with the United States. In October 1967 the National 
Security Council decided that the Foreign Ministry should 'retire from the 
policy making arena and limit itself to conducting international negotiations'. 
In relation to non-proliferation Tlatelolco's potential to justify Brazilian 
reluctance to join the NPT soon became clear. During the 1967 Conference on 
non-proliferation Correa da Costa emphasised Brazil's participation in the 
regional non-proliferation regime while reiterating its commitment to nuclear 
energy development. Brazil's partial commitment to Tlatelolco proved to be a 
useful shield against US pressure to adhere to the NPT. The superpower's 
interest in the latter treaty was regarded as a serious obstacle to Brazil's 
determination to achieve scientific and technological self-sufficiency. In the 
nuclear field that goal was increasingly justified by the need to ensure energy 
supplies.176 
Opposition to the NPT was first manifested at the ENDC when the Brazilian 
delegate, Correa da Costa, explictly stated that 'Brazil will not accept any non-
proliferation commitment which might lead to a new form of dependency'.177 
During the XXII UNGA Magalhaes Pinto again mentioned Tlatelolco as 
evidence of Brazil's commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. 
Brazilian opposition to the NPT was then based on the treaty's 'endorsement 
of a distinction in the technological status of party states'.178 
By the beginning of the 1970s the effects of the lack of a clear and 
independent nuclear energy policy became clear in the perception of the 
country's limited technological capacity. All equipment for nuclear reactors was 
not only imported from the United States but was also installed by US 
technicians. Despite strong criticism of such dependence, in 1972 Brazil 
accepted Westinghouse's proposal to build the country's first power reactor. 
The reactor was to be fuelled by uranium mined in Brazil but enriched in the 
United States.179 
The lack of a clear and firm nuclear policy could be partly explained by the 
lack of capacity of the military to foster development. The 1969 succession 
crisis caused by Costa e Silva's illness put in question the stability and 
coherence of his long term policies. Furthermore, internal divisions within the 
military establishment caused serious discontinuities in some of the most 
important economic and bureaucratic reforms.180 The nuclear programme was 
no exception and, like most scientific and technological projects, it was also 
affected by this general lack of consistency. 
Pressures on Brazil's energy policy mounted as it became clear that the 
economic policy success, 'the Brazilian Miracle', of the Medici years was not 
only dependent upon favourable external conditions but also upon high and 
expensive energy consumption.181 The turning point came in 1973. The oil 
crisis hit the Brazilian economy and revealed its great vulnerability to external 
pressures in the energy sector, as did the disclosure by the US Atomic Energy 
Commission that it could not guarantee enriched uranium deliveries, previously 
agreed with Brazil for the recently acquired Westinghouse reactor. The United 
States, which until then had maintained absolute control over enriched uranium 
supplies, began to seem questionable as a reliable source of fuel.182 
After the 1973 'shock' Brazil began to pursue a new 'responsible 
pragmatism' in its foreign policy which enabled Itamaraty to regain a policy 
making role.183 New signs of independence were evident in its diplomatic 
approach towards the Arab states, and in its efforts to diversify its export 
markets and its sources of energy, technology and foreign investment. The 
nuclear aspect of energy received a special and renewed emphasis. 
The steps taken during the late 1960s served as the basis for the 
implementation of the new nuclear goals. In 1968 nuclear matters had been 
briefly discussed during Willy Brandt's visit to Brazil. The German company 
Siemens had already won the Atucha I contract in Argentina and had awakened 
the interest of Brazilian military circles. In 1969 a bilateral agreement for 
scientific and technical cooperation had been signed between Germany and 
Brazil and in 1971 nuclear cooperation had been formally instituted.184 But 
it was only after the 1973 energy crisis and the failure of the United States to 
fulfil its uranium deliveries that intensive nuclear negotiations actually 
began.185 
An agreement was reached in February 1975 by which Germany agreed to 
assist with technology and equipment in the construction of eight power 
reactors as well as enrichment plants and reprocessing facilities. Brazil was to 
acquire an independent nuclear power industry and Germany would help to 
discover further uranium reserves in order to ensure access to them, and would 
thereby make inroads into the fast-developing international nuclear energy 
market.186 These moves marked a change in what Gall calls the geopolitics 
of uranium supplies, from US monopoly to the spread and diversification of 
enrichment capacity to other countries. The Brazilian-German agreement was 
a move towards greater independence for both sides, through which Brazil 
would become a potential exporter of nuclear fuels. 
This agreement also revealed the predominance of those who had advocated 
nuclear independence over a long period. Even though it could be argued that 
this shift in policy orientation was largely the result of an international 
contingency, the debate underlying the change of direction actually revealed a 
deeper trend in the course followed by Brazilian foreign policy. 
Previous signs of success of its outward-oriented economic policy had 
increased the self-confidence of the Brazilian government, leading to a new 
emphasis on Brazil's role as an emerging regional power. While cooperation 
with the United States had continued, the complex nature of the relationship 
between the emerging regional power and the United States had also increased 
the number of areas of potential conflict. The issue of nuclear energy offered 
the first evidence of a more radical posture. The extent of Brazil's decision to 
withdraw from its special relationship with the United States, became quite 
clear with the signature of the Brazilian-German agreement, which showed its 
determination to achieve nuclear independence. Nevertheless, the reluctant 
acceptance by Brazil of wide provisions and safeguards accompanying the 
agreement revealed its decision to neutralise or, when possible, to avoid 
differences and consequently antagonism with the United States.187 The main 
factor behind increasing Brazilian assertiveness was a more fragile international 
economic posture resulting from the combination of the impact of the oil crisis, 
a mounting foreign debt, and increasing protectionism in the industrialised 
countries, exemplified by the US 1974 Trade Reform Act. These trends 
provided the basis for the emergence of a new foreign policy consensus 
between the foreign policy and economic policy elites favouring a greater 
assertiveness for Brazilian foreign policy, including nuclear energy issues.188 
Although it seems difficult to assess the exact role that mutual perceptions 
about foreign policy and nuclear energy decisions and development played in 
the course followed by the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear energy programmes, 
it seems clear that they provided the ground for potential competition. Relations 
between the two countries had significantly improved after the 1966 military 
coup in Argentina as a result of increasing convergence of attitudes in 
ideological and security issues. Yet signs of increasing Brazilian interest in 
pursuing an independent nuclear policy awakened Argentine concern. This 
situation came to the surface after the 1974 shift in the Brazilian nuclear 
programme. In the journal Estrategia an article by J.E. Gugliamelli reflected 
Argentine preoccupations: 'given the available facts it is possible to affirm that 
Brazil has taken the firm decision to join the nuclear club, that is, to make an 
atom bomb under the pretext of peaceful uses . . . the decision to manufacture 
the nuclear explosive and the opportunity are critical for Argentina since our 
neighbour's nuclear device will affect our security palpably and decidedly'.189 
Most analysts seem to agree that the 1974 Indian explosion, together with the 
opening in that same year of the Argentine nuclear plant had a catalytic effect 
upon the latent nuclear rivalry between Brazil and Argentina, reinforcing 
Brazilian interest in pursuing an independent path after the enriched uranium 
crisis of that same year. The position of both states towards the NPT and the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco could be partly interpreted as a symptom of an erosion of 
US power and influence on nuclear and regional issues. 
In the late 1970s President Carter attempted to redress this situation. His 
commitment to nuclear non-proliferation put pressure on both Brazil and 
Argentina while promoting the creation of a group of nuclear suppliers in order 
to achieve common guidelines for nuclear exports. In his view this problem 
could only be solved by a multilateral approach. The London suppliers group 
started its meetings in London during the mid 1970s with the aim of reducing 
the detrimental effects of commercial competition on safeguards requirements, 
which had gradually undermined the non-proliferation regime. Disagreement 
about the application of safeguards, resulting particularly from French and 
German opposition to full scope safeguards as basic conditions for cooperation 
or trade, obstructed the achievements of the organisation. 
US interest in strengthening non-proliferation in Latin America increased 
significantly in 1975 when, at the request of Senator Abraham Ribicoff, a US 
intelligence enquiry revealed the diversion of 50kg of plutonium from the 
Atucha power reactor in Argentina. Even though disagreement concerning the 
validity of the results arose between the US Energy R&D Administration, 
which denied that the incident had occurred, and a number of influential 
senators who insisted on the need to strengthen the regional non-proliferation 
regime, Argentina came under constant US pressure to adhere to the NPT and 
the Tlatelolco Treaty.190 
Similarly, concern with the implications of the 1975 Brazil-German 
agreement led Carter to pursue diplomatic efforts aimed at revoking the 
agreement.191 In Brazilia Henry Kissinger explained that the purpose of his 
visit lay in 'strengthening US-Brazilian friendship, which became increasingly 
important as Brazil emerged as a new power'.192 The Brazilian reaction to 
American pressure was fairly clear. As had been the case during the NPT 
negotiations, references to Tlatelolco were offered as proof of Brazilian 
commitment to 'non-discriminatory non-proliferation'.193 Subsequently, in a 
speech delivered in Washington, Azeredo da Silveira, the Brazilian Foreign 
Minister, expressed his hope of finding mutually satisfying solutions so that: 
misunderstood interests and unfounded suspicion do not lead to fruitless 
divergences. In this respect I honestly mention the lack of understanding, 
among certain American sectors, in relation to the Brazilian decision to 
develop a peaceful nuclear industry.194 
Equally, US pressure led Argentina to announce that it had started the 
process towards ratification of Tlateloco but this was later halted by the 
Falklands/Malvinas war.195 The transition to democracy in that country 
increased the expectations of a rapid Argentine adherence, but these have not 
been fully fulfilled. However, and paradoxically, American pressure on both 
Argentina and Brazil helped to turn earlier concern over Argentina's nuclear 
aspirations into cautious cooperation. Argentina's official statements 
condemning US policies and suggesting the negotiation of a bilateral agreement 
on nuclear cooperation were warmly received in Brasilia.196 
References to the idea of nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil 
were clearly linked to US pressure on Brazil's decision to pursue an 
independent nuclear programme. During the period characterised by tension in 
US-Brazilian relations Argentina sided with Brazil and what had simply started 
as a sequence of declarations supporting Brazil gradually evolved towards clear 
cooperation. In 1977, just after Canada had suspended the transfer of an 
enrichment plant to Argentina, on the basis of lack of sufficient safeguards, the 
Argentine ambassador to the United States made public the interest of his 
country in establishing a common Argentine-Brazilian front to resist US 
opposition to the construction of enrichment plants.197 In that same year the 
first informal talks between the two countries led to a joint communique 
stressing cooperation in nuclear matters. The underlying factors leading to this 
process were: first, the common interest of the parties in resisting increasing 
US pressure; secondly, economic incentives at a time when budgetary 
constraints were first making their impact; and third, the shift in Brazil's main 
area of interest towards Latin America, which followed Figuereido's accession 
to power.198 
Although it is always difficult to judge the exact role of personalities, under 
Figuereido Argentina and Brazil first reached an agreement which not only put 
an end to the long dam disputes on the Parana River but paved the way to wider 
cooperation in the energy sector. At the time of the Itapu-Corpus agreement 
Figuereido admitted in an interview that the two countries could in fact 
cooperate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.199 Formal cooperation 
started in 1980 during Figuereido's visit to Argentina with the signature of four 
agreements in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The first document 
contemplated the creation of an organisation similar to EURATOM which 
would enable the parties jointly to demand full access to nuclear technology in 
international fora. 'SUDATOM' would also include joint research and 
development in order to reduce costs and to assess the viability of a South 
American nuclear industry. Control mechanisms were also envisaged both to 
ensure the peaceful and environmental uses of nuclear energy, and to enable the 
parties to resolve differences as they might arise. In the wider context of 
Argentine-Brazilian relations these agreements highlighted the common interest 
of the parties in promoting Latin American integration.200 
Clearly, these agreements would grant the parties greater ability to oppose 
suppliers' restrictions and to achieve greater access to advance technology. 
Equally important was their impact on increased security through a greater 
degree of confidence and mutual understanding of the others' actions at a time 
when Brazil's incursion in the development of nuclear energy provided fertile 
ground for misperceptions and miscalculations. 
These agreements were subsequently followed by a number of contracts by 
which the parties arranged the exchange of technology and technicians, and the 
development of joint aircraft and missile programmes. In 1980, 120 tons of 
Argentine uranium were transferred to Brazil in exchange for equipment and, 
one year later, three additional agreements were signed between Argentina's 
NAEC and Nucleabras for technological exchange and the additional supply of 
240 tons of uranium to Brazil's Angra de Reis.201 Contrary to what some had 
anticipated, Argentina's achievement of a uranium enrichment capability in 
1983 did not inhibit the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochment. To this contributed 
Alfonsin's decision personally to convey the news to Figuereido, as well as the 
meeting that year between the two presidents which was intended to update the 
1980 agreements. Both presidents recognised the ideal stage reached by 
Argentine-Brazilian relations which allowed the two countries to embark on an 
ambitious joint enterprise: the construction and export of nuclear power stations 
to Latin America and other developing countries.202 Although subsequently 
delayed by financial constraints, differences over designs, and the reluctance 
of the Brazilian military with regard to joint development of high technology, 
these initiatives materialised first in the 1986 plans for a joint venture between 
the Brazilian company Embraer and the Argentine Ministry of Defence for 
research and production of civil and military aircraft, and secondly in the 
Argentine-Brazilian Integration Protocols of that year for the co-production of 
nuclear fuel for test-reactors.203 
It would be wrong to underestimate the role of such cooperation agreements 
in reducing tensions and uncertainties between the two countries. Yet it is 
particularly important to emphasise the contribution of a number of measures, 
specifically designed to reassure the other party, in laying the foundations for 
what could eventually emerge as a 'security community' between them.204 
These have included visits to military installations dating back to the 1980 visit 
of Argentine generals to Brazil, a number of official decisions and declarations 
such as Figuereido's references to 'the conciliation of interests and aspirations 
within a climate of confidence and cooperation', or Alfonsin's personal 
message with regard to Argentina's capacity to enrich uranium and his decision 
to place the NAEC under civilian control.205 There is little doubt that one of 
the most significant steps in this direction was the joint declaration issued 
during the 1985 Sarney-Alfonsin summit at Foz do Iguagu which included a 
security protocol.206 Two factors deserve special attention with respect to this 
process: firstly, the transition to democracy in both Argentina and Brazil, and 
secondly, the return of non-proliferation to the US foreign policy agenda. 
Although responding to distinct circumstances, and following entirely different 
paths, the fact that both transitions took place at relatively the same time further 
contributed to the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochment. Equally important was the 
renewed interest shown by the Bush administration in preventing nuclear 
proliferation and the associated pressure on the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear 
programmes. 
Following the signature of the Iguagu declaration, Alfonsfn and Sarney 
embarked on a process of closer cooperation which started with their 
ratification of the previous agreement on nuclear cooperation. Sarney's visit to 
a nuclear facility in Argentina was seen as clear indication of the commitment 
of the two presidents to promote greater confidence between their countries. As 
had been the case with Argentina's mastery in enriching uranium, Sarney 
transmitted to Alfonsin, through confidential notes in 1987, Brazil's recently 
acquired capacity to enrich uranium.207 Elections in 1989 brought Menem and 
Collor to the Argentine and Brazilian presidencies. In 1990 the two presidents 
again decided to revive the waning integration process which had been started 
by their predecessors. Although numerous obstacles persisted, similar to those 
which hindered previous integration endeavours, and there is little doubt that 
these moves have been significantly encouraged by wider international trends 
towards the formation of regional blocs, relations between the two countries 
continued to take place in a particularly friendly environment. 
Evidence since the late 1970s suggests a gradual transformation of 
Argentine-Brazilian relations from competition to cooperation. Clearly, there 
is a danger of overstating the lasting character of such transformation as well 
as of the real scope for integration, but it would equally be wrong to 
underestimate the positive impact that important decisions and significant 
events had on former sources of insecurity. Transition to democracy in both 
countries, together with the successive policies promoting greater trust, 
particularly in the nuclear field, played a crucial role in this process.208 
Undoubtedly these changes have contributed to the enhancement of security 
in the Southern Cone and the strengthening of the regional non-proliferation 
regime. Yet it is by no means clear that these conditions will remain static. The 
long term prospects of stability will continue to depend on the overall balance 
between the perceived benefits and costs of developing nuclear weapons; 
between wider incentives favouring non-nuclear postures and those backing the 
nuclear option. More recently, a sequence of important decisions have offered 
clear indication of the strength of the Argentine-Brazilian commitment to non-
nuclear defence. These include: 1) joint appointment of representatives to the 
IAEA; 2) their intention to reach an agreement to renounce all military uses of 
nuclear energy; 3) their participation, for the first time, as observers during the 
1990 NPT Review Conference; 4) their public declarations renouncing the 
military nuclear option; 5) the 1990 nuclear policy declaration of Iguacu 
concerning the creation of a common system of 'accounts of critical materials' 
and the adoption of measures conducive to their full adherence to Tlatelolco; 
6) their signature in December 1991 of safeguard agreements with the IAEA; 
and finally, 7) their joint declaration of that same month concerning their 
decision to submit a modified text of the Tlatelolco Treaty to OPANAL. 
Despite all this, important trends remain which could eventually obscure this 
picture.209 
Among the factors which have created some uncertainty about the underlying 
confidence in Argentine-Brazilian relations in the 1980s, three deserve special 
attention. Firstly, the lessons of the Falklands/Malvinas war. Secondly, the 
fragility of the new democracies and the legacy left by military regimes both 
in relation to dominant doctrines of national security and to the relative 
autonomy and prerogatives of the military with respect to weapons 
acquisition.210 And thirdly, the impact of new technological inroads by either 
Brazil or Argentina in their bilateral relations. 
The Falklands/Malvinas war and the related arms embargo convinced 
Argentina of the need to reduce and if possible to eliminate its dependence on 
external supplies. While it is true that this dramatic experience exposed 
Argentina's total incapacity to sustain adequate logistical support for combined 
army, navy and air force actions, it also revealed to Brazil the existence of 
previously unknown Argentine military capability.211 Not only did the war 
have a clear impact on Argentina's decision to rearm, but it also encouraged the 
consideration of nuclear submarines programmes within the region and it 
clearly coincided with the acceleration of missile programmes.212 Since 1984 
Iraq, Argentina and Egypt had joined efforts to develop the Condor missile 
programme while Brazilian industries currently manufacture a wide variety of 
rockets some of which seem capable of delivering nuclear payloads.213 
Although these missile programmes have serious limitations in the development 
of reliable guidance and motor technology, they have brought to the fore the 
new threat posed by missile proliferation in the developing world, and equally 
important, the extent of the cooperation established among 'threshold nuclear 
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Plans to develop nuclear submarines in the region date back to Brazil's 1979 
decision to develop secretly a capability to enrich uranium. In that year the 
Institute of Energy and Nuclear Research started work on ultracentrifuge 
techniques outside the scope of IAEA regulations. These plans were unveiled 
in 1987 at the time when the Brazilian government made public its recently 
acquired capability. Their disclosure made clear the existence of what became 
known as the 'parallel nuclear programme' through which Brazil achieved 
secretly and without any external help such technological breakthrough.215 
At a time of balance of payments difficulties the potential export market for 
enriched uranium served to justify publicly what many regarded as intended, 
among other things, for the production of fuel for nuclear submarines.216 
While unveiling the 'parallel programme' the Brazilian president reaffirmed the 
'peaceful character' of the Brazilian nuclear programme. Yet he left no doubt 
of 'Brazil 's firm determination to achieve full access to scientific progress as 
well as to its practical applications'. At the time the chief of the armed forces, 
General Paulo Campos, insisted that Brazil should not accept any international 
restrictions in the field of nuclear energy.217 
The disclosure of the Brazilian 'parallel programme', four years after the 
transition to democracy had taken place, highlighted the scale of the challenge 
posed by strong military institutions to both the consolidation of the new 
democracies and to the current rapprochement between the two regimes. The 
economic adjustment which accompanied both Brazilian and Argentine 
transitions to democracy prompted the military to argue that these policies were 
rendering their countries 'defenceless'. The 'parallel programme', together with 
previous arms purchases by the Argentine Navy with secret funds, revealed the 
degree of autonomy of the armed forces vis-a-vis the executive and legislative 
powers.218 Although in Brazil the disclosure of the 'parallel programme' 
played a significant role in the decision to incorporate a clause in the 1988 
Constitution committing Brazil to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful 
purposes, the definite character of the Constitution is still unclear. Not only are 
important changes in the 1988 Constitution or even its replacement still 
expected, but most importantly, the Brazilian legislature - like its Argentine 
counterpart - has virtually no traditional and routine ways to investigate major 
defence initiatives.219 
Nearly a decade after the transition to democracy of both Argentina and 
Brazil serious doubts remain as to the effectiveness of civilian-democratic 
control of the military. Alfonsin's efforts aimed at greater civilian control of the 
military had no parallel in Brazil and were subsequently abandoned by his 
successor who has acquiesced to military demands and prerogatives. In this 
context it seems important to recall the previous critical role played by the 
military in reinforcing the perception of nuclear issues as vital for the national 
security of their respective countries, To the extent that the military continue 
to assert their prerogatives and their control over geopolitical and strategic 
thinking, the long term prospects of the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement 
appear less certain.220 
The process started by the 1980 Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation 
agreement has rightly raised expectations about the role of confidence building 
measures and policies aimed at the reduction of mutual suspicion by 
transforming former competition into cooperation, and possibly in setting the 
basis for an eventual emergence of a 'security community'. Yet the pattern of 
events previously outlined also makes clear the presence of significant 
difficulties still facing the regional non-proliferation regime. 
It is true that current optimism could take comfort from the renewed 
international commitment to nuclear non-proliferation which has followed the 
Gulf War and from clear signs of progress in the Latin American non-
proliferation regime. The decision by Argentina and Brazil to adopt measures 
conducive to their full adherence to Tlatelolco and their signature of safeguard 
agreements reinforce this view. Similarly, the suspension by Argentina of the 
Condor II programme since 1990 as well as Itamaraty's apparent inclination 
towards suspending all nuclear programmes appear, at first sight, to be 
promising moves.221 Yet both considerations have undoubtedly been 
associated with international pressures, and most importantly they still lack the 
unconditional support of the Argentine and Brazilian military institutions. Once 
Congress had approved Collor's initiative to open the Brazilian computer 
industry to foreign competition, Brazil's nuclear 'transparence' would clearly 
remove another source of tension in its relations with the United States.222 In 
the case of Argentina, the decision to halt the Condor missile was apparently 
associated with wider negotiations aimed at re-establishing diplomatic relations 
with Great Britain. As the Argentine Foreign Minister affirmed in London,. 
'Argentina was anxious to demonstrate its desire to play a responsible role in 
international affairs'. 223 Notwithstanding this, the extent to which the military 
institutions have shared these decisions was made clear by the dissatisfaction 
of important military figures in both countries. Menem's suspension of the 
Condor missile was strongly criticised by the former chief of staff of the air 
forces, while in Brazil the Navy Minister openly protested at the Foreign 
Ministry's plans to suspend all nuclear programmes in exchange for US 
concessions. Admiral Flores arduously defended in Congress the continuation 
of his service's plans to build a nuclear powered submarine and condemned all 
plans to negotiate a new military cooperation agreement with Washington.224 
What these events seem to indicate is the persistence of important interests 
opposed to strict non-proliferation commitments. Yet the signature of the 1991 
IAEA agreements has clearly reinforced the position of those who favour non-
nuclear postures. Non-nuclear postures, as non-proliferation commitments, are 
far from being static, and their continued viability seems to be dependent upon 
constantly updated inducements. Such inducements work at both the internal 
and external levels and are linked, on the one hand, to measures geared towards 
effective democratic control of military institutions, upon which the solidity of 
the final unilateral renunciation of the military nuclear option rests, and on the 
other, to wider international trends such as nuclear powers' policies seeking to 
minimise the political and military utility of nuclear weapons. As Iraq's near-
nuclear capability demonstrated, challenges to non-proliferation could also arise 
from international safeguarded nuclear activities. This type of challenge will 
remain closely linked to the motivations that provide the foundations of the 
positive value attached to non-nuclear postures and that influence the decision 
of states unilaterally to avoid the nuclear option. In an international situation 
in which environmental concern has already led to greater promotion of nuclear 
energy, such inducements as well as stricter international safeguards will be 
decisive.225 
Undoubtedly, the conditions and the progress achieved by the Latin 
American non-proliferation regime offer a solid basis for the continued viability 
of the positive value attached to non-nuclear status in Latin America. In this 
respect the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the permanent control organisation set up 
by the treaty have made evident their potential to adjust to changes and to 
reconcile greater flexibility with safe regulation. Equally important has been 
their contribution to an increasingly favourable perception of the advantages 
attached to non-nuclear defence. Ironically, Argentina's and Brazil's partial 
opposition to the Tlatelolco Treaty enabled both countries to exchange views, 
to better understand each others concerns and eventually to transform their 
previous competition into open cooperation. It is not clear if in the absence of 
Tlatelolco, or if faced with a stricter regional non-proliferation regime this 
rapprochement would have been possible. What one could affirm with some 
certainty is that Tlatelolco, by offering the South American states a forum to 
exchange their particular views about non-proliferation policies, encouraged a 
rapprochement which has clearly alleviated anxieties about the opponent's 
intentions. The most likely challenges to be faced by the regional non-
proliferation regime in the future relate, firstly, to the expected modifications 
to the treaty which Argentina and Brazil will soon submit to OPANAL, 
secondly, to the provision of stringent safeguards upon which confidence in 
non-proliferation rests, and, in the longer term, to the evolution of the 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship. 
A critical evaluation of the Latin American 
Nuclear-Free Zone 
As with the case of the NPT there are strong differences within the 
international community about the success or otherwise of the Latin American 
NFZ established by the Treaty of Tlateloco. Opinions vary from strong 
denunciations of it as discriminatory, in virtue of its maintenance of the 
distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear states, to the view that the Latin 
American NFZ represents a successful instrument for arms control. 
Let us first consider the major criticisms that have been made of the treaty. 
One approach is to ask how the treaty has performed in terms of its own 
objectives, namely: a) in the prevention of horizontal proliferation; b) setting 
up a framework for international cooperation on the controversial question of 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly PNEs; c) limiting the nuclear 
warfare options of the superpowers; and d) keeping Latin America out of the 
arena of nuclear competition. 
In order to be effective in preventing horizontal proliferation the agreement 
would have to encompass all the countries and particularly those with nuclear 
potential or aspirations. The Latin American NFZ has been criticised or indeed 
regarded as a failure because it has not achieved the incorporation of all the 
parties to whom the treaty is open for signature. This criticism has been 
particularly sceptical about the possibilities of Argentina and Brazil becoming 
full parties to the agreement. The Tlatelolco Treaty is also said to be 
considerably weakened by the unwillingness of Cuba to join it and that of 
France to join Protocol I. 
One of the most frequent criticisms of the treaty deals with its permissive 
character, traditionally focusing on its ambiguous treatment of PNEs which 
were seen as weakening the arms control impact of the agreement. Another 
category of criticisms concerns the relationship between the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco and the NPT. These criticisms have focused on what they consider 
an international practice leading to the subordination of Tlateloco and 
OPANAL to the NPT. Criticisms have also been levelled at the Tlatelolco 
Treaty on the grounds that it failed explicitly to prohibit the transit of nuclear 
weapons and therefore allowed the existence of nuclear targets within the 
region. This criticism could be linked to the objectives of limiting the warfare 
option of nuclear powers and that of keeping Latin America out of the nuclear 
competition. 
Before considering the responses to each of these criticisms, a preliminary 
defence could be made that the Treaty of Tlatelolco is a subtle document 
reflecting the underlying context of its formulation. It therefore needs to be 
seen in these terms, allowing for adjustments as international circumstances 
change. The creation of a permanent organisation, including the Council and 
the General Conference, is fundamental in this respect, since it represents the 
best counter-argument to criticisms made on the ground that the treaty has not 
fulfilled all its objectives. 
As far as the question of participation is concerned the failure of certain 
states to adhere fully to the agreement could be counterbalanced by the success 
achieved in obtaining all relevant signatories to Protocols I and II, with the sole 
exception that of France. Secondly, the nature and number of qualifications and 
criticisms made by these parties could also be seen as evidence of the extent to 
which they acknowledge both the political and moral value of the treaty, and 
the costs of violating it. Finally, participation could increase as the result of 
perception of the advantages of membership. This was particularly clear to 
Argentina during the Falkland/Malvinas War. Moreover, and as mentioned 
earlier, the recent renunciation of PNEs by both Argentina and Brazil has 
removed one of the main obstacles to Argentina's ratification, while the more 
recent interest of these countries to participate fully in the regional non-
proliferation regime are no doubt encouraging. In the case of Cuba, although 
acceding to Tlateloco could have been used as a bargaining chip in an eventual 
attempt to normalise relations both with the United States and the Latin 
American states, under the current conditions this is hardly the case. Despite 
this, Cuba's harsh struggle to insert itself in a rapidly changing international 
environment has underlaid its more favourable consideration of Tlatelolco. The 
withdrawal of the USSR as a major power and its subsequent disintegration 
have shaken Cuba's international position and deprived the island of its 
previous strategic protection. Under these circumstances the Latin American 
non-proliferation regime could be seen as offering Cuba some form of security. 
Cuba has recently declared its willingness to acceed to the Tlatelolco Treaty as 
soon as the expected full adherences of Argentina, Brazil and Chile take 
place.226 
In regard to the second and strongest set of criticisms, relating to Tlatelolco's 
permissiveness, although the recent declarations by Brazil and Argentina 
suggesting their renunciation of PNEs could contribute to remove this question 
from the list of criticisms, Brazilian and Argentine missile programmes as well 
as their efforts to develop nuclear submarines highlight the permanent challenge 
of new technological inroads and the need continuously to update the non-
proliferation regime. Could a more flexible position, relying both on the 
regional system of control and on the favourable regional conditions, lead, on 
the one hand, to the full enforcement of the treaty, and on the other to effective 
nuclear non-proliferation? Both the outcome of the PNEs dispute, and the 
positive evolution of the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relation offer insights into 
the potential of regional regimes for effective non-proliferation. 
The criticism that Tlatelolco has been subordinated to the NPT, and that it 
has therefore inherited its discriminatory character, has been most vehemently 
put by the Latin American states with potential or aspirations to become nuclear 
powers. The response to these claims includes the argument that the Latin 
American NFZ had to acknowledge the reality of the existence of five nuclear 
powers at the time of its framing and that it even represented the acceptance of 
the status quo. Acknowledging this was the only way to find a practical solution 
to further proliferation and to reduce internal and external nuclear threats. 
Supporters of this position do not always defend the distinction between nuclear 
and non-nuclear states as a permanent factor and favour policies aimed at a 
reduction in the number of nuclear states - even if the prospects for this are 
minimal or negligible - as the best way to eliminate this distinction. 
An analysis of the relationship between NFZs and the NPT should consider 
them as supplementing each other, rather than as alternative mechanisms. 
Differences between the two instruments are obvious, and arise from their 
different origins, motivations, and negotiating processes, which influence the 
legitimacy attached to them. In this regard it has been stated that one of the 
strengths of NFZs, when compared with the NPT, lies in the nature of their 
negotiating processes which are open to all states party to the agreement, 
whereas the NPT negotiations took place almost exclusively between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. This difference also accounts for one particular 
objective of NFZs: that of containing the military presence of hegemonic 
powers. In proscribing the presence of foreign nuclear forces in a given 
geographical area, in addition to prohibiting the possession of nuclear weapons 
by the countries party to the zone, a nuclear-free zone arrangement is wider in 
scope than the NPT. However, in certain regions, especially those dominated 
by deep political tensions, the alternative of a NFZ may prove even more 
difficult than accession to the NPT.227 A third advantage that NFZs seem to 
offer is the incorporation of 'negative' security guarantees by the nuclear 
powers, that is guarantees by these powers that they would not resort to the use 
or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. The lack of such 
guarantee in the NPT has been acknowledged and attempts have been made to 
redress it through 'positive security guarantees' embodied in UN Security 
Council resolution 255 adopted in 1968. 
But beyond these differences a natural link exists between both instruments, 
given that they focus on the same problem: nuclear proliferation. This was 
acknowledged in article 7 of the NPT. But this article does not assign a 
subordinate role to NFZs, nor does it consider them as regional appendages. 
The practice which has been the object of criticism - that of sending reports to 
the NPT Conference and standardisation of the IAEA system of safeguards -
could also be seen as the 'natural' consequence of the relationship between a 
universal and a regional organisation in which the scope of their practices 
determines the character of the relationship. 
Both the global and the regional non-proliferation regimes have been 
affected by wider international developments in the field of nuclear technology. 
Beyond the interest of the nuclear powers, economic and security 
considerations have come to complicate the picture. Some events and 
developments like the oil crisis and the increasing availability of nuclear 
technology have eroded the basis of both the NPT and Tlatelolco. Commercial 
pressures and short-term economic interests threaten international efforts to halt 
the spread of nuclear weapons as well as long-term security interests. The 
creation of the London Suppliers Group represented an effort aimed at the 
strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. This group comprised 15 
countries which agreed on a list of materials, equipment and technology which 
could undermine safeguards. A special system of safeguards for these items as 
well as for any 'replicated' facility was consequently designed. 
By 1980 the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) had 
concluded that although certain measures could delay full access to the nuclear 
cycle, any method of releasing nuclear energy entailed access to critical fissile 
materials. In 1984 member states met to consider further measures to strengthen 
the non-proliferation regime, in particular measures to incorporate the so-called 
'second tier suppliers' like Brazil, China and Argentina. Initially Third World 
countries, particularly those which had systematically emphasised the 
discriminatory character of non-proliferation policies, claimed that such a club 
represented a cartel serving the nuclear powers' economic interests and which 
in fact denied the right of non-nuclear states to nuclear supplies as embodied 
in NPT article IV.228 Although Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela 
participated in the INFCE, and Argentina was actively involved acting as co-
chair of one of the INFCE's eight working groups on spent fuel management, 
these efforts did not produce tangible results. Argentina, like other developing 
countries with growing nuclear programmes, remained sceptical of the 
relevance of the INFCE.229 
During the 1980s, efforts to control nuclear proliferation faced again the lack 
of interest of the Reagan administration, which went as far as to suggest US 
withdrawal from the IAEA. Under the Reagan administration not only was non-
proliferation far from being a high priority, but the civilian use of plutonium 
was openly encouraged.230 Although Bush had initially shown more interest 
in halting the spread of nuclear weapons, during the first years of his 
administration the absence of clear policies was the dominant note. Evidence 
of this was provided by its delay in appointing the official at the US Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, responsible for the US position in the 1990 
NPT Review Conference. 
Evidence of the gradual undermining of the non-proliferation regime was 
first found in the increasing number of countries which had sought to acquire 
enrichment and reprocessing plants despite the absence of clear economic or 
technological justification. In Latin America, the regional non-proliferation 
regime was threaten by the evolution of both the Argentine and Brazilian 
nuclear programmes which achieved in 1983 and 1987 the capability to enrich 
uranium. From the second half of the 1980s a sequence of events revealed the 
magnitude of the challenges currently faced by the non-proliferation regime. 
By the beginning of the decade increasing cooperation between threshold 
nuclear power and the proliferation of missile programmes throughout the 
developing world signalled the continued consideration given to nuclear 
defence by developing countries.231 In the Middle East, Mordechai Vanunu's 
dramatic case offered significant evidence of an existing Israeli arsenal of 
approximately 100-200 nuclear warheads.232 Moreover, Iraq's rapid advances 
in the nuclear field first prompted Israel's bombing of the Osirak nuclear 
reactor in 1981 and after a decade proved to be a crucial element in the events 
leading to the 1991 Gulf War. These events have provided further evidence of 
the need constantly to update the non-proliferation regime at a time when 
rigorous verification, through its confidence building effects, has been 
identified as the main element underlying trustworthy commitments.233 
As nuclear power spreads and nuclear technology becomes more easily 
available, formal adherence to and observance of agreed non-proliferation rules 
offer the only means of ensuring that these trends will not be accompanied by 
nuclear weapons proliferation. Even though enforcement of these rules has 
proved to be a difficult task, it could be said that states do not tend to accept 
international obligations with the intention of violating them. In fact, countries 
with nuclear weapons potential or aspiration have chosen to adhere to the NPT 
rather than to disregard their commitments. In the case of the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, as the Brazilian and Argentine cases seem to show, such countries 
have chosen to obstruct the entry into force of the agreement, rather than to risk 
open violations. Not only have their recent apparent renunciation of PNEs, their 
joint declaration renouncing the military nuclear option, and their conclusion 
of IAEA safeguards agreements removed significant obstacles to their full 
adherence to Tlatelolco, but these could also reflect a more positive evaluation 
of non-nuclear status. Yet, as we have seen, the perceived advantages 
associated with non-nuclear postures have a dynamic character which ultimately 
depends on the changing balance between the perceived costs and benefits of 
nuclear capabilities. In the immediate future the main challenges will no doubt 
relate to the implementation of a safe system of safeguards which ensure that 
technological progress will not endanger the regional non-proliferation regime. 
Ultimately, the real tests of both the global and regional non-proliferation 
regimes continue to depend on their capacity on the one hand to attract those 
states which have either obstructed or remained outside their regulations, and 
on the other, to provide a safe framework for the transfer and development of 
nuclear technology. 
Concerning the last criticism, that of transit, it has been argued that the 
omission of the question does not imply that the treaty had positively legislated 
in this respect. Moreover, the mechanism through which each party could grant 
or deny transit could eventually lead to a uniform policy of denial through the 
working of OPANAL. Nevertheless the prevailing opinion seems to be that 
transit of nuclear weapons within the zone takes place and will continue, given 
the role played by the sea arm of deterrence. The extremely complicated nature 
of this issue has been reflected in the fact that recent negotiations on the Law 
of the Sea have tacitly acknowledged the legality of nuclear transit. 
Undoubtedly, the development by either Brazil or Argentina of nuclear 
propelled submarines would further complicate this picture. 
Finally, an evaluation of the Latin American NFZ should confront the main 
aims of its formulation, comparing them with the present reality. On balance 
the treaty has so far succeeded in avoiding both the deployment of nuclear 
weapons in the region by existing nuclear powers, and regional proliferation. 
It is of course difficult to establish beyond doubt that the Tlatelolco regime 
itself has prevented these trends: the first, particularly, could also be attributed 
to tacit understanding between the superpowers after the Cuban missile crisis. 
Assessment of Tlatelolco's influence on the prevention of regional 
proliferation appears to be more complicated. Despite the fact that impasse 
seems to be the dominant note and that events in Argentina and Brazil tend to 
suggest that the formula provided by article 28, for the complete entry into 
force of the agreement, could significantly complicate the achievement of this 
goal, there are other signs which give some hope for progress. In the first place, 
and even before the apparent decision by Brazil and Argentina to surrender the 
right to PNES and to adhere fully to Tlatelolco, the 'rigorous' interpretation of 
the treaty not only prohibited them but made any country exploding such a 
device a de facto nuclear power. In addition, the fact that the signatories to the 
treaty, even if they have not ratified it, are obliged to refrain from acts that 
would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty works as a basic mechanism 
of international pressure against proliferation. This obligation has more recently 
accompanied Brazilian and Argentine plans to submit a modified version of the 
treaty to OPANAL. 
For the time being the question of nuclear proliferation within the region will 
remain a cause for concern but not for alarm. The balance between the benefits 
and the costs of developing nuclear weapons, for both Brazil and Argentina, has 
so far been maintained. Evidence of this balance has been embodied in the 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation which started with the 1980 agreement. 
This agreement also raised expectations as to the possibility of confidence-
building measures and policies aimed at the reduction of mutual suspicions, as 
supplementary means of dealing with the problem of nuclear proliferation. The 
Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Latin American organisation set up by the treaty 
represent a useful forum for these purposes. 
A current evaluation of the practice of the agreement, of the extent to which 
the regional non-proliferation regime has improved the national and regional 
security of Latin American states, should probably emphasise the absence of 
nuclear weapons and therefore of nuclear targets within the region. In this way 
it could be said that the probability of war arising out of nuclear incidents has 
been kept at a minimum. In regard to the reduction of tensions and rivalries 
within the area the regional non-proliferation regime has proved helpful. Even 
though a latent rivalry underpins the nuclear programmes of Brazil and 
Argentina open competition between the two countries has not arisen, and has 
even led to gradual and increasing cooperation. Yet, as the Brazilian submarine 
programme suggests, potential risks remain and serve to remind us of the 
inescapable need continuously to reinforce the value of non-nuclear postures. 
It is in this context that the success of the regional non-proliferation regime in 
minimising the political and strategic utility of nuclear weapons should be 
assessed. 
Conclusion 
The process leading to the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Latin 
America during the 1960s offers interesting insights into the strengths and 
weaknesses of non-proliferation schemes where two set of motivations seem to 
coincide: the hegemonic interests of the nuclear powers and the independent 
calculations of regional states. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 provided a 
common ground for the manifestation of the interest in non-proliferation of 
both the superpowers and the Latin American states. These interests not only 
emerged gradually but were also expressed in different ways. This paper has 
attempted to correct the common view of the Latin American nuclear-free zone 
as resulting purely from the independent will of the Latin American states. The 
idea of a Latin American NFZ originated in the 1950s in a plan proposed by the 
then US Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson and was first put 
forward as a Costa Rican proposal. It is certainly the case that a second 
proposal put forward by Brazil was inspired and motivated by Brazilian 
participation in the ENDC where the questions of nuclear testing and non-
proliferation received wide attention. Yet this proposal was abandoned in the 
confusion brought about by the Cuban missile crisis and was only later taken 
up by the Mexican government. 
Even though Mexico had also participated in the ENDC since early 1962, it 
had rejected the 1958 Costa Rican proposal and had cautiously responded to the 
Brazilian proposal. Until then the Mexican position was to insist that 
denuclearisation should result from the unilateral decisions of states and that 
NFZs could only be temporary and transitory measures. From the documents 
and speeches of the period it is clear that the emergence of Mexico in 1963 as 
the new leading force behind regional denuclearisation cannot be explained in 
terms of changes of administration leading to significant shifts in foreign 
policy, and that it took place with the full approval of and constant consultation 
with the US government. 
Although the United States took a low profile vis-a-vis the different 
proposals for regional proliferation in Latin America, evidence of its support 
for this goal can be traced as far back as the 1950s. This can partly be 
explained as the result of strong Latin American reaction to signs of 
intervention on such issues related to national sovereignty. Thus, if ever a 
promoter of the idea of regional denuclearisation, the US government would 
perhaps have preferred to make use of suitable interlocutors. Given available 
evidence it still seems difficult to assess fully the extent to which either Costa 
Rica or Mexico served as interlocutors of US non-proliferation interests within 
Latin America. Yet close cooperation with the United States and the use of the 
forum of the OAS in the first case, and Mexican collaboration with US 
intelligence services against Cuba during the mid 1960s, show at least 
significant convergence of priorities. 
The motivations underlying US support for a Latin American NFZ arose 
from the strong interest of certain Latin American states, namely Argentina and 
Brazil, in the nuclear option; from the perceived advantage of insulating the 
region from the dangers of US-Soviet competition which were clearly 
demonstrated by the 1962 Cuban crisis; from a wider and genuine interest in 
non-proliferation; as well as from the convenience of maintaining overall US 
hegemony in the region. 
The case of the Soviet Union was complicated by its commitment to the 
defence of Cuba and by the consequent Cuban alignment. Traditionally the 
Soviet Union had not only supported but actively promoted plans for NFZs 
throughout the world. In the case of Latin America since 1964 the Soviet Union 
distanced itself from the Cuban position, adopting a more cautious and 
pragmatic posture. Soviet adherence to the agreement became then only 
conditional on the support of all nuclear powers and it was finally achieved in 
1979. 
It would be misleading to suggest that the regional non-proliferation regime 
created in 1967 was solely the result of external pressure. The origins of the 
initiative need as well to be set within the context of a wider international 
concern vis-a-vis the risks of nuclear proliferation. Moreover, there can be no 
doubt that the Cuban missile crisis marked a decisive stage in the way Latin 
American states perceived nuclear proliferation. But it is equally true that this 
event provided a common stimulus for the superpowers to cooperate in setting 
up a framework to manage their nuclear relationship and the problem of nuclear 
proliferation. What we see at this juncture is the coming together of the 
different interests of the parties involved, that is, a significant convergence of 
priorities leading to the creation of a regional non-proliferation regime. 
Yet the complications which emerged during the negotiating process as well 
as the difficulties that have accompanied the implementation of the agreement 
reflected two related sets of tensions. While it is certainly true that most Latin 
American states must have foreseen significant advantages in a non-
proliferation regime, there would be a cost to those which had contemplated the 
nuclear option. Indeed, for some Latin American states, namely Argentina and 
Brazil, this situation led to a difficult choice. As we have seen, the dilemma 
that total renunciation of the nuclear option posed to these countries was partly 
and temporarily resolved by a complicated formula, embodied in article 28 
which regulates the entering into force of the agreement, or simply through 
non-ratification. It seems important to underline that the advantages of a 
regional non-proliferation regime when measured against the costs of 
foreclosing the nuclear option continue to pose a dilemma to these countries. 
This was illustrated by the case of Argentina during the Falklands/Malvinas 
War. On the one hand, its partial commitments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
precluded Argentina's right to take advantage of the legal and political 
instruments provided by the agreement. But on the other hand, this crisis also 
highlighted some of the advantages associated with nuclear technology as 
further consideration of nuclear propelled submarines has demonstrated. 
To the second set of related tensions belong the consequences attached to the 
spread of nuclear technology and the difficulties involved in distinguishing 
peaceful from non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy as shown by the extreme 
case of peaceful and non-peaceful nuclear explosions. Even though by the time 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco was negotiated such difficulties already appeared 
intractable, in order to cover up this underlying difference the treaty provided 
ground for both interpretations. As the criteria for distinguishing between 
peaceful and non-peaceful nuclear explosions became ever more blurred, non-
peaceful nuclear explosions became the accepted international norm. This norm 
has even been reinforced by India's difficulties in conducting a second 
'peaceful ' explosion and by the more recent Argentine-Brazilian renunciation 
of their traditional claim to conduct PNEs. 
The enforcement of the Treaty of Tlatelolco provides useful insights into the 
difficult question of international controls over nuclear technology. One of the 
main obstacles to the implementation of the regional non-proliferation regime 
has been the standardisation of the system of safeguards with that of the NPT. 
Although the emphasis of Argentina's reservations have varied from one 
administration to another, among the motivations that have influenced 
Argentine reluctance to adhere to the agreement, the system of control appears 
as predominant factor. Both Argentina and Brazil continue to insist on the need 
to provide Tlatelolco with a genuinely regional system of control. 
As we have seen, the evolution of Brazilian and Argentine attitudes towards 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been strongly influenced by political and economic 
considerations. If national prestige and security considerations provided the first 
set of justifications for the development of nuclear programmes, economic 
considerations have come to play a more significant role. In the case of non-oil 
developing countries, the need to secure energy supplies led to the perception 
of nuclear energy as the cheapest and best way to counter energy vulnerability. 
In addition, and in the light of the continued constraints and demands posed by 
the debt crisis, the nuclear industry began to be considered as a candidate for 
the development of new exports and export markets. From this point of view, 
then, nuclear energy development was placed as a high priority that neither 
Brazil nor Argentina could or were willing to expose to tight international 
constraints. 
Those considerations have been greatly influenced by the role played by the 
military in the Brazilian and Argentine political systems. Not only could the 
military, through the maintenance of important prerogatives and their dominion 
over geopolitical thinking, alter the current Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement, 
but also the peaceful character of their nuclear programmes. Until their recent 
completion of IAEA safeguard agreements, both countries managed to limit 
international surveillance over their respective nuclear programmes, whilst their 
position with respect to the sensitive question of 'special inspections' still 
remains unclear. Moreover, both states continue to oppose the NPT. 
As more recent events have indicated, the regional balance between the 
benefits and the costs not only of developing nuclear weapons but even of 
keeping the option open have so far been maintained. Had Argentina ratified 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco it would have had a better legal and political basis from 
which to raise the issue of the presence of nuclear weapons within the zone's 
limits during the Falklands/Malvinas war. The same applies to the 1980 
Brazilian-Argentine nuclear cooperation agreement which suggests that both 
countries have perceived greater advantages in confidence-building measures 
than in taking further steps involving the risk of an arms race. 
The governments of both Brazil and Argentina have expressed their 
preference for the Treaty of Tlatelolco and together with Chile they have 
systematically rejected adherence to the NPT. From an extreme non-
proliferation perspective this posture could appear contradictory, yet these 
states have insisted that it is the standard system of IAEA safeguards that 
represents the main obstacle to their acceptance of both agreements and have 
also claimed that such standardisation was the unfortunate consequence of 
having subordinated Tlatelolco to the NPT. As recent Brazilian and Argentine 
plans to submit to OPANAL a modified text of the treaty suggest, it could be 
argued that Tlatelolco would have better chances of entering fully into force if 
a more flexible system of control, of the kind applied to Germany by 
EURATOM, were adopted.234 So long as stringent verification is ensured, 
OPANAL's system of control and favourable regional conditions could provide 
a basis for realistic accommodation. These two factors could guarantee 
sufficient international supervision and thus overcome one of the main 
obstacles to the implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This could in turn 
open the prospects of consolidation of the regional non-proliferation regime on 
a basis that would enable most Latin American states to benefit. 
The evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco led us to 
conclude that despite all criticisms Tlatelolco has, first and most importantly, 
contributed to the absence of nuclear weapons and consequently of nuclear 
targets within the region. Second, it has had an important role in reducing, to 
a relatively low level, the risk of war arising out of a nuclear incident within 
the region. The removal of potential targets as well as the achievement of 
nuclear powers' guarantees have been fundamental in keeping this risk low. 
Third, it has been a significant factor in preventing horizontal proliferation. 
Tlatelolco has not only provided a framework for dealing with the potential 
nuclear rivalry between Argentina and Brazil, but most importantly for its 
gradual transformation into cooperation. In this way the regional non-
proliferation regime has also helped to reinforce the positive status of non-
nuclearity by downplaying the political and strategic utility of nuclear weapons. 
Finally, by providing a regulatory framework to deal with the difficult question 
of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it has offered greater prospects for further 
progress. Evidence of real progress has been recently provided by the 
Argentine-Brazilian renunciation of PNEs. 
The characteristics which seem to explain the achievements of Tlatelolco 
include its genuinely collective nature and Latin America's de facto 
denuclearised status during the negotiation of the agreement. Similarly, the 
absence of serious tensions or potential threats leading states within the region 
seriously to consider the need to keep the nuclear option open. This may have 
highlighted the potential advantages perceived in non-proliferation compared 
to the costs of renunciation. Moreover, as previously mentioned, the Cuban 
missile crisis provided a common ground for a collective perception of the 
advantages and disadvantages of denuclearisation. Indeed, perceived advantages 
in creating a non-proliferation regime encouraged negotiators to accept 
obligations. These conditions in turn stimulated a belief in disarmament and 
facilitated the emergence of the political leadership and political will needed to 
keep negotiations going until the conclusion of the respective treaties. 
As the decision of both Brazil and Argentina to renounce the military nuclear 
option - announced during the 1990 NPT Review Conference - seem to 
indicate, the political benefits expected from the potential nuclear status have 
proved disappointing while the disadvantages have come to the surface in the 
form of suspension of nuclear supplies, further regional proliferation limiting 
expected advantages, covert competition involving potential and costly arms 
races, the risk of superpower intervention and the limited or non-utility of 
nuclear power in peacetime.235 
In contrast, the path towards nuclear proliferation clearly illustrates the 
security dilemma in which the efforts of one state to increase its security can 
only come about at the expense of others. The security dilemma is a 'structural 
notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs 
tend automatically (i.e. regardless of intention) to lead to rising insecurity for 
others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of 
others as potentially threatening'.236 This dilemma appears at the core of the 
ambiguity pursued by near nuclear states. The decision to keep the option open 
has temporarily held the balance between what they perceive as two equally 
unfavourable alternatives: to become locked into the cycle of arms 
accumulation, or, by rejecting it, to become exposed to the risks of military 
inferiority. 
Could this security dilemma be alleviated by states shifting towards common 
security and/or non-provocative means of defence? Could voluntary restrictions 
and freely accepted limitations provide the basis to a transition from national 
security to common security? Whatever the answers to these difficult questions 
it seems clear that in the nuclear age common security is essentially linked to 
common survival.237 
Notions about common security depart from the assumption that the ability 
to wage aggressive war is often the result of possession of offensive weapons. 
Common security favours non-provocative defence postures in which the 
offensive could be limited or if possible avoided. It then follows that to the 
extent to which states can organise their security policies in cooperation rather 
than in confrontation, the risk of offensive arms races developing between them 
could be considerably reduced. Collective organisation of security policies 
would require that all participants share at least the basic common security 
assumptions that would demand voluntary restrictions on national defence. 
These restrictions could involve limitations on armaments, notions of no-first-
use, confidence building measures, and so on.238 
In view of the growing international consensus in favour of non-
proliferation the principles enshrined in the Tlatelolco Treaty no longer appear 
so marginal or irrelevant to the global security debate as critics once assumed. 
Indeed, the Latin American experience indicates that the nature of its 
negotiating process could offer greater chances to establish the foundations for 
common security. This is not only the result of the common interests shared by 
regional states but equally importantly follows from the commitments that 
negotiators extract from nuclear powers. In addition, this scheme has proved to 
be significantly effective in providing common ground for dealing with the 
conflicting interests between nuclear and non-nuclear states. Greater security 
has been achieved not only by a simple act of renunciation of the nuclear option 
but also by regulations that prohibit any stationing or deployment of nuclear 
weapons, as well as by security guarantees from the nuclear powers not to use 
or threaten to use nuclear weapons. 
Finally, the Latin American NFZ has offered a sound framework for the 
promotion and regulation of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and has 
therefore contributed to alleviating the dilemma that lies at the core of the non-
proliferation regime. Restrictions on transfers of nuclear technology have only 
enjoyed temporary success and as states showed their capacity to develop 
indigenous and independent nuclear programmes the long-term failure of this 
policy became clear. Even if there seems to be no easy way out of this 
dilemma, the framework of common security offered by NFZs could provide 
a basis for the conciliation of nuclear energy development with non-
proliferation. 
As the Latin American experience indicates, a basis for common security 
could be an important factor in the perception of a balance favouring the 
advantages rather than the costs pf non-nuclear status. Nuclear-free zones could 
offer a sound framework for promoting and regulating the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy through the setting up of systems of control better adapted to the 
interests of regional states, and the development of regional fuel cycle 
capabilities and regulations for the administration of most critical materials. 
Finally, as the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement suggests, NFZs could 
provide the necessary conditions to develop more effective means of 
cooperation, mediation and confidence building, and control measures over the 
direction followed by nuclear energy programmes. 
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